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Software and hardware attacks on embedded and medical devices can cause serious
harm if not quickly detected. This dissertation presents techniques based on hardware sig-
natures aiming to address the part of the attack surface which entails inserting malicious
hardware circuitry (Hardware Trojans) during the manufacturing process of a digital mi-
crochip and maliciously modifying executable code at run-time.
On the hardware side, the type of Hardware Trojan (HT) discussed in this work is com-
posed of a few gates and attempts to modify the functionality of the chip. Such types of
extremely small HTs are hard to detect using other conventional offline HT detection meth-
ods, such as side-channel analysis and digital systems test techniques. Our novel approach,
however, focuses on an online method for rapidly detecting HTs at run-time by checking
for the correct functionality of the underlying hardware. We present an architecture that
addresses these threats by splitting the design into a two-chip approach where we generate
signatures in the hardware at the very beginning of data harvesting, and we then check for
these signatures during data processing and encryption. In addition, we take advantage of
known physiological relationships between medical data to ensure the integrity of the data
that is processed by the hardware.
On the software side, techniques that detect attacks on application code at run-time
typically rely on software due to the ease of implementation and integration. However,
these techniques are still vulnerable to the same attacks due to their software nature. In this
work, we present a novel hardware-assisted run-time code integrity checking technique
where we aim to detect if executable code resident in memory is modified at run-time by
an adversary. Specifically, a hardware monitor is designed and attached to the device’s
main memory system. The monitor creates page-based signatures (hashes) of the code
running on the system at compile-time and stores them in a secure database. It then checks
for the integrity of the code pages at run-time by regenerating the page-based hashes (with
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unmapped regions zeroed out) and comparing them to the legitimate hashes. The goal is
for any modification to the binary of a user-level or kernel-level process that is resident
in memory to cause a comparison failure and lead to a kernel interrupt which allows the
affected application to halt safely. We are able to check the majority of executable code
with the exception of a few page table entries to redirect application code to libraries.
Our experimental results demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of our proposed
and implemented techniques. Specifically, our HT detection architecture was able to not
only detect HT attacks but also distinguish these attacks from actual health problems. In
addition, our run-time code integrity checking technique was able to rapidly detect zero-day
malware attacks while introducing minimal resource overhead and negligible performance






The rapid technological advancement that we are featuring in our lives has led to an increas-
ing reliance on technology in our everyday activities. With the emergence of the Internet-
of-Things (IoT), we are seeing embedded devices become increasingly interconnected and
widespread spanning the range of applications from simple entertainment consumer elec-
tronics to complex and safety critical applications such as medical devices, driverless cars
and smart power grids. Attacks on such highly-connected embedded devices have increased
significantly in the past decade. The majority of these attacks have come from the fact that
embedded devices are typically resource-constrained and cannot afford the luxury of hav-
ing full-blown security primitives implemented on them. Moreover, the connection of these
resource-constrained devices to the public internet opens an extensively increasing plethora
of software vulnerabilities including run-time code modifying attacks that attempt to ma-
liciously change the behavior of running applications on an embedded device’s operating
system (OS).
In addition, embedded devices have been targets of malicious insertion of undesirable
logic functions into the hardware of fabricated digital chips. Such malicious behavior has
been facilitated by the disaggregation of the chip manufacturing industry. The aforemen-
tioned stealthy hardware modifications are referred to in the literature as Hardware Trojans
(HTs). HT attacks have been shown to have the ability to leak sensitive information or even
alter the functionality of a system. HTs could be inserted during any stage of the fabrication
process. For example, Figure 1.1 shows that even if the design team is trusted, an insider
can insert an HT during physical design and verification or even during fabrication. The
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Figure 1.1: The disaggregation of the chip manufacturing industry has led to increasing
possibilities of malicious hardware modifications.
effects of HTs can be disastrous if the attack targets sensitive applications such as medical
or embedded military devices. For example, in 2010, the United States Navy discovered
missiles provisioned with fake microchips with a “back door” that could have been used to
remotely shut the missiles down at any time, rendering them useless [1]. Moreover, a very
recent report released by Bloomberg in early October 2018 claims that the supply chain of a
major server motherboards manufacturer has been compromised by the insertion of a back-
door chip [2]. Over the past decade, research agencies and groups have been looking for
ways to verify that digital chips are not hacked during the production process. For instance,
in 2016, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the IEEE Center for Secure Design
released reports spotlighting security red flags for the wearable industry, one of which is
falsifying a user’s health data by physically manipulating the device [3, 4].
Designing techniques to detect hardware and software attacks in such small embedded
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devices has proven to be a non-trivial task. On the hardware side, techniques that try to
perform offline testing, such as side-channel analysis or digital systems test, have so far
not been able to guarantee the security of the chip. In addition, online techniques that
try to detect HT attacks at run-time need careful design considerations due to the energy
consumption and computing power limitations for these devices.
On the software side, while conventional security measures, such as security proto-
cols/standards and cryptographic algorithms, provide a strong basis for securing embedded
systems by addressing security considerations from a theoretical perspective [5], relying
solely on conventional approaches has proven to be ineffective as newer trends have shown
that most attacks take advantage of weaknesses present in the implementation of an em-
bedded device. Specifically, a system’s security can be compromised through corruption of
binaries as they are being downloaded or stored on the embedded system or through the ex-
ecution of untrusted or unknown sources. Techniques that perform checking of executable
code at compile and load time have been widely spread and proven to be effective [6–
8]. However, techniques that verify correct run-time execution are still a major challenge,
especially when targeting resource-constrained embedded devices [9–12]. For example,
consider an operating system (OS) that is running a user-level application. The system
typically starts by loading the application code from disk to memory. Although there have
been a plethora of techniques that ensure the integrity of the code while it is present on disk
and right before load-time, verifying the correct execution of that same code while it is res-
ident in memory presents new challenges. Malicious activities, such as malware running
on a system, can try to modify the code content at run-time. In fact, these types of attacks
have recently become more prevalent. For instance, G. Holmes classified malware in com-
promised devices into five variants [13], three of which use a run-time infection method to
modify and/or insert malicious code where modifications are made to the in-memory copy
of the executable code.
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1.2 Sample Embedded Medical Application
Electrocardiogram (ECG) and Ballistocardiogram (BCG) sensors are normally used to
monitor and capture heart pulse electrical and timing events. Figure 1.2 presents a health
monitoring scenario showing a person standing on a BCG scale and holding on to an ECG
handlebar. The BCG force-plate adjusts itself with pumps to non-invasively capture three-
dimensional BCG forces that represent the cardiogenic vibrations of the body [14–16]. The
ECG handlebar is used as a grip-style dry electrode for ECG measurement [17]. The per-
son’s cellphone (shown in the figure) is used to capture 3D on-body inertial measures to
help adjust the person’s postural sway and generate improved and more accurate ECG and
BCG readings. Therefore, the BCG hardware is running a real-time application with data
processing to provide the necessary balancing mechanisms. In this work, the ECG sig-
nal along with the BCG signals are used to create the necessary hardware signatures that
check for the integrity of the captured data. Harvested ECG and BCG data are typically
further processed and analyzed to extract physiological features that assist in the diagnosis
of health conditions [14, 15, 18].
Figure 1.2: A medical device example showing a patient’s heart signals being captured in
real time.
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The presented application shows the importance of providing security against malicious
entities not only at the software level but also at the hardware level. For example, an attack
on the ECG or BCG data as it is being harvested could result in maladjustment of the
postural sway pumps of the BCG scale potentially affecting a patient’s balance and causing
harm. Therefore, it is imperative to present security solutions to such resource-constrained
embedded devices to not only protect against the integrity of the data as it is being captured
but to also protect the software performing the computation at run-time.
1.3 Research Overview
Figure 1.3a presents a high level overview of the attacks and errors that are targeted in this
research. Specifically, the research addresses HT attacks, hardware errors and malicious
software code modifications in embedded medical devices. Figure 1.3b shows an overview
of our novel architecture where medical device hardware is partitioned into two chips. The
first chip (Chip 1) is responsible for capturing sensor data and performing initial signature
generation, while the second chip (Chip 2) is responsible for checking for the integrity of
the captured and processed data. The presented architecture targets HTs that are extremely
small in size and which, once triggered, attempt to modify the functionality of the chip by
attacking the user’s data. This work is motivated by the health monitoring scenario pre-
sented in Section 1.2 which includes sensors capturing heart signals and transmitting them
for further processing and analysis [14]. The physiological signals have known relation-
ships which are used to create multiple types of signatures that assess the integrity of the
captured data at run-time [19–22].
In addition, this work presents a novel hardware-assisted run-time code integrity check-
ing technique which ensures that code resident in memory is protected at run-time from
any malicious modification [23]. Specifically, we perform run-time memory monitoring
through a separate and isolated hardware monitor. Page-based signatures (memory signa-
tures), which are stored in a system’s root-of-trust, are generated at compile-time and are
5
(a) Targeted attacks and errors
(b) Designed and implemented architecture
Figure 1.3: An overview of the targeted attacks and errors on embedded medical devices
and the designed and implemented architecture to address these attacks.
then checked at run-time using the dedicated hardware monitor. Any modification to the
binary of a process that is resident in memory will cause a comparison failure and lead to a
kernel interrupt which will eventually cause the affected application to halt safely.
Our work improves consumer confidence in health monitoring applications by increas-
ing the assurance provided to the public that their captured health data are correct. For
example, consider a scenario where health data collected by such applications are used
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to interact with drug titration procedures (i.e., where medical dosage is varied dynamically
and without necessarily visiting a doctor). An HT attack or a malicious software in-memory
code modification can cause misleading analysis of the patient’s health leading to possible
lawsuits. Providing confidence in data readings reduces putting a person’s health in danger
and may also provide legal protections, i.e., additional legal defense.
1.4 Dissertation Organization
The remaining chapters of this dissertation are organized as follows.
Chapter 2 presents some background and prior work related to hardware Trojan research
and code integrity research. An overview of the different types of hardware and software
attacks is presented along with a survey of the current state-of-the-art techniques present in
the literature to address such types of attacks.
Chapter 3 discusses in detail the specific hardware and software threat models that are
addressed in this dissertation. The assumed triggering methods, the payloads and the effects
of such attacks on the hardware and software of an embedded medical device are presented.
Chapter 4 introduces one of the two major contributions of this dissertation. Specifi-
cally, a novel HT detection technique based on the use of hardware signatures is presented
to assess the integrity of a patient’s health data as it is being harvested by medical sensors.
Details of the sub-components of the designed and implemented method are then explained
followed by an analysis of how the architecture is set up to detect specific types of the HT
attacks presented in our threat model.
Chapter 5 presents the second major contribution of this dissertation. The chapter starts
by introducing a methodology for assessing run-time code integrity and detecting mali-
cious modifications to code performing computation on user’s data. A hardware-assisted
architectural implementation of the presented methodology is then described in detail along
with the challenges of implementing such an architecture on an embedded system.
Chapter 6 presents the experimental setup, hardware implementation, results and anal-
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ysis showing the effectiveness of the two presented architectures on assessing the security
and integrity of both data and computation in embedded medical devices.
Chapter 7 highlights the advantages of the presented methodologies in this disserta-
tion as it pertains to the impact of these techniques on embedded systems security in gen-
eral. Specifically, some example case scenarios are discussed showing how our hardware
signature-based architectures can be used to implement chip-level security frameworks for
assessing data integrity in generic sensor nodes. Moreover, the chapter discusses some open
research questions and avenues for improving the presented techniques in this dissertation.
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the work presented in this dissertation and highlights the
major contributions of this research.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR WORK
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present some background and literature review regarding the two ma-
jor topics of this dissertation. We first start by introducing Hardware Trojan research by
providing a summary of the known types of attacks along with a survey of the detection
techniques presented in the literature. We then provide background related to run-time
code integrity and present a survey of the different types of code integrity attacks along
with the software, hardware and hardware/software codesign detection mechanisms. In ad-
dition, the advantages and disadvantages of each of the hardware and software detection
techniques are highlighted. Finally, before concluding this chapter, we present some back-
ground about hardware signature generation and digital systems test as they relate to the
hardware primitives utilized in the techniques presented in this dissertation.
2.2 Hardware Trojan Research
Hardware Trojan attacks on highly interconnected embedded devices can cause severe dam-
age, especially in the medical field. Techniques to detect and try to prevent these HTs from
infiltrating digital chips have been receiving increased attention in the past several years.
2.2.1 Classification and Attacks
Over the past decade, a more formal HT taxonomy has been introduced [24]. Figure 2.1
shows how different types of HT attacks can be classified according to three broad char-
acteristics: (i) physical characteristics, (ii) activation characteristics and (iii) action charac-
teristics [24]. The (i) physical characteristics divide the HT attacks according to their dis-
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Figure 2.1: A Hardware Trojan taxonomy characterizing HTs according to their physical,
activation and action properties.
tribution on the chip, their size (small, medium, or large), their structure (layout changes)
and their type (parametric or functional). The (ii) activation characteristics divide them into
internally activated HTs and externally activated ones. Externally triggered HTs wait for
an activation signal coming from outside the chip. Internally triggered ones can be classi-
fied into two subtypes: (a) an always on HT and (b) a conditionally triggered HT with the
latter having the condition dependent on some logic in the circuit or some sensor attached
to the circuit. The (iii) action characteristics divide the HT attacks according to their effect,
i.e., whether the HT is going to leak information, modify the circuit’s specification, and/or
corrupt or disable functionality.
2.2.2 Detection Mechanisms
Designing techniques to efficiently detect malicious hardware modifications in embedded
devices has proven to be a non-trivial task. Techniques that try to perform offline testing
for HTs, such as side-channel analysis or digital systems test, have so far not been able to
guarantee the security of digital chips. In addition, online techniques that try to detect HT
attacks at run-time need careful design considerations due to the energy consumption and
computing power limitations for these devices.
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Quite a few HT detection methods [19–22, 24–34] have been proposed to address spe-
cific types of the aforementioned attacks. These methods can be broadly divided into side-
channel analysis techniques, HT triggering techniques and correct functional verification
techniques.
2.2.2.1 Side-channel Analysis
This type of HT detection relies on analyzing information gained from the physical im-
plementation of an architecture. The information gained from side-channels are typically
compared to data generated by the normal behavior of a chip to detect anomalies. En-
ergy consumption, timing analysis and electromagnetic emanations are the most common
techniques for side-channel analysis. The authors of [24–27] provide multiple types of HT
detection methods including methods that are based on power analysis and timing analysis.
These types of methods lack the ability to detects HTs that are small in size such as the
ones introduced in [28, 29] due to the minor effects that the HT might cause in terms of
power and timing variations.
2.2.2.2 Hardware Trojan Triggering
This type of HT detection relies on extensively testing the design prior to deployment and
use (i.e., right after chip fabrication). Prior work has proposed methods to detect HTs with
significant hardware footprints, e.g., using a “golden die.” For example, in [30], the authors
introduce an HT prevention and detection mechanism for integrated circuits (IC) where
they prevent a wide variety of HT attacks during IC testing and system operation in the
field. However, the presented mechanism relies on comprehensive schemes of special error
detecting codes resulting in increased hardware overhead of up to 165% [30]. Also, the
authors of [31, 32] provide a survey of multiple types of HT detection methods including
methods that are based on HT activation mechanisms. HT detection approaches based
on a “golden die” present a variety of disadvantages. First, cleverly inserted HTs may
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not be easily triggered by these approaches as the testing mechanisms have no idea of the
presence of the HT and/or its location in the chip. Thus, the HT might pass the testing phase
undetected. Second, this type of detection does not guarantee the correctness of the design
at run-time. Finally, performing an offline full-functionality test for each fabricated chip
might turn out to be inefficient and time-consuming, thus increasing the cost of microchips.
2.2.2.3 Functional Verification
This type of HT detection relies on checking the functionality of the hardware by mon-
itoring the output and checking for expected behavior. The authors of [24, 31] provide
a survey of multiple types of HT detection methods including methods that are based on
architecture-level detection and functional verification. Others have devised techniques
that solely rely on functional verification for checking the trustworthiness of the underly-
ing hardware [33, 34]. The work presented in this research falls under this category where
hardware signatures are created to check for the correct functional behavior of the digital
microchip at run-time [19–22]. However, while the techniques presented in prior research
are able to detect HT attacks on internal components of a digital microchip, it is important
to note that, to our knowledge, this work is the first to address an HT threat where input
values are immediately altered as they initially appear on a digital microchip.
2.3 Code Integrity Research
Checking the integrity of application code running on an operating system (e.g. Linux) has
been a long researched topic. Several methods have been proposed including software-only
methods and hardware-assisted ones. In addition, these techniques are broadly divided into
ones that look for malicious modifications in executable code prior to load-time and ones
that provide run-time code monitoring.
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2.3.1 Software Attacks
A major portion of attacks on embedded devices is due to the injection of malware espe-
cially with the increasing internet connectivity of these devices. Malware attacking such
devices can be divided into several categories such as viruses, Trojan horses, spyware,
rootkits and other intrusive code [7]. Each of these types of malware performs a specific
goal whether it is affecting an application’s behavior, leaking sensitive information, spread-
ing network traffic to cause denial of service, or spying on some user’s activity.
To better understand and study the weaknesses that these attacks exploit, a division
of these vulnerabilities into major classes exists in the Common Vulnerabilities and Ex-
posures (CVE) and Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) standards developed by the
MITRE Corporation [35, 36]. Some of the major classes involved with embedded systems
security are buffer errors, code injection, information leakage, permissions, privileges, ac-
cess control and resource management. Buffer error vulnerabilities are mainly introduced
by allowing code to directly access memory locations outside the bounds of a memory
buffer that is being referenced. Code injection weaknesses are usually exploited due to
the lack of verification of what constitutes data and control for user-controlled input lead-
ing to the injection of inappropriate code changing the course of execution. Information
leakage weaknesses are introduced when the system intentionally or unintentionally dis-
closes information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that in-
formation through sent data or through data queries. Permissions, privileges, and access
control are weaknesses introduced due to improper assignment and enforcement of user
or resource permissions, privileges, ownership and access control requirements. Finally,
resource management weaknesses are mainly related to improper management and use of
system resources, such as making resources available to untrusted parties and improperly
releasing or shutting down resources.
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2.3.2 Software and Hardware Countermeasures
A wide variety of techniques have been proposed in the literature to detect malicious modi-
fications to processes running on embedded systems. These techniques are broadly divided
into anomaly-based detection and signature-based detection methods where the former is
involved in detecting abnormal behavior of operation after the detection engine has learned
what forms a safe environment, while the latter is involved in looking for known patterns
in which an adversary performs the attack on the system [7, 37]. Both of these techniques
have their own advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, while the anomaly-based
detection techniques help in capturing new (zero-day) attacks, they usually introduce un-
desirable false positives since a simple deviation from expected behavior could potentially
trigger an alarm. On the other hand, signature-based detection techniques provide a good
approach to capturing known attacks; however, they are unlikely to detect a new attack if
the attack’s signature is not present in the signature database. However, a majority of these
techniques have been mostly or fully implemented in software and are thus vulnerable to
software attacks.
2.3.2.1 Compile-time and Load-time Code Inspection
Traditionally, code integrity in computer systems and embedded devices has been provided
by a Linux Integrity Measurement Unit (IMU) [6]. IMUs typically verify the integrity
of executable content in an operating system at load-time by inspecting the integrity of
executable files before loading them.
Plenty of research has been done in this area alongside others such as static analy-
sis software-based techniques that try to find possible security vulnerabilities in the code.
However, all these techniques are not able to detect or prevent run-time attacks [6, 10].
A survey of common code injection vulnerabilities and software-based countermeasures is
presented in [38]. One common weakness among these types of code inspection methods
is the infeasibility of discovering all vulnerabilities in a given program by automated static
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analysis alone [39–42].
2.3.2.2 Run-time Code Inspection
Techniques that attempt to detect malicious modifications to application code at run-time
have been highly relying on software due to the ease of implementation and integration.
However, these techniques are still vulnerable to the same attacks due to their software na-
ture. For example, extensions to the IMU have been added to implement dynamic integrity
measurement and to detect and prevent return-oriented programming (ROP) attacks [9, 10,
43]. However, such types of implementations use some form of tracking code and therefore
are implemented purely in software which keeps the tracking code vulnerable to attacks.
In addition, the IMU extensions’ support for run-time detection comes at the expense of
performance overhead.
Dynamic software-based techniques usually augment the code by adding some run-time
checks so that an attack can be detected. These techniques require either the modification
of the target code by adding a new number of executed instructions or the implementation
of a separate software monitor in the form of a protected process to keep track of the
propagation of data and control during program execution. Therefore, these techniques
either require code recompilation or new monitoring code introduction in which both would
eventually incur a significant performance overhead [44–46].
Intel SGX and ARM TrustZone have been developed to secure and protect code in-
tegrity by isolating user code and allocating private regions of memory [47, 48]. These
techniques are complimentary to our presented technique; however, they serve a slightly
different goal. Their focus is to separate running applications into secure (trusted) and
non-secure (non-trusted) worlds, thus preventing potential attacks on applications running
in the secure world, while our work focuses on providing a mechanism to rapidly detect
attacks on executable code of any running application. In addition, the implementation of
such techniques on resource-constrained devices might turn out to be a challenging task.
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Other research work has introduced a combination of hardware/software and hardware-
assisted architectures to monitor programs and look for malicious behavior. In these pre-
sented approaches, the methods to detect anomalies depend on monitoring the control flow
execution of an application [11, 12, 49, 50] or rely on instruction-based monitoring [51–
53]. In the former, static analysis of expected program behavior is extracted and then used
by hardware monitors to observe the program’s execution trace. Thus, such techniques im-
pose limitations on coding styles and are vulnerable to introducing frequent false positives
with any simple deviation from normal behavior, primarily due to the fact that the method
relies on having an application follow a predefined control flow without allowing for run-
time decision making changes. The latter introduces a significant amount of performance
overhead. For example, performing integrity checking on basic blocks as described in [51]
results in generating a hash for every set of instructions that fall between two consecutive
control transfer instructions.
2.4 Hardware Signature Generation and Digital Systems Test
One of the key technologies we rely on in this work is the ability to compute a digital
“signature” of a bitstream where the signature is compact (significantly fewer bits than the
associated stream of bits) yet has a very low probability of producing the same signature
for a different input bitstream. Therefore, if an HT corrupts either the signature or the input
stream, the mismatch can be identified with a high level of certainty.
Bitstream signatures can be generated using different techniques and algorithms. Mes-
sage Authentication Codes (MACs) are traditionally used to compute and generate signa-
tures for use in data transmission. MACs are broadly divided into two types: Cipher Block
Chaining MACs (CBC-MACs) and Hash-based MACs (HMACs). CBC-MACs use cipher
blocks to create the signature, while HMACs depend on hash functions to provide data
integrity and authentication. One commonly used type of HMAC is the Secure Hash Algo-
rithm (SHA). The main advantage of SHA is that it provides signatures with high security
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features. However, this comes on the expense of area and increased energy consumption.
Another type of signature generation typically used in digital systems test is a Multiple
Input Signature Register (MISR) [54]. In this work, we take advantage of MISRs to create
our signatures. The major incentive behind our use of MISRs is their advantage in terms of
area and energy consumption over MACs and specifically SHA; in particular, if the MISRs
are already in the chip for test purposes, why not reuse them for security purposes?
The following subsections introduce SHA and a specific type of MISR, the BILBO
MISR, followed by a brief discussion comparing their area consumption and security fea-
tures pertaining to signature generation.
2.4.1 Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)
In cryptography, messages can be signed by a secure hash algorithm (SHA). Several ver-
sions of SHA exist with SHA-2 and SHA-3 [55] considered to be acceptably secure. How-
ever, the high security introduced by these algorithms comes at the expense of significant
(large) layout area and energy consumption.
For example, in the report of the SHA-3 cryptographic hash competition that is pub-
lished by NIST [56], it has been stated that the area of full implementations of 256-bit
SHA-3 ranged between 39k Gate Equivalents (GE) on 130nm CMOS technology [57] and
80kGE on 65 nm CMOS technology [58]. Both of these designs were optimized for max-
imum throughput/area. A compact (lightweight) implementation of the 256-bit SHA-3
algorithm was around 15kGE on a 90 nm CMOS technology [59].
2.4.2 Built-In Logic Block Observer (BILBO) Multiple Input Signature Register (MISR)
A Built-In Logic Block Observer (BILBO) is one form of Built-in Self-Test (BIST) tech-
niques in digital systems test [54]. A major feature of BILBO is the use of existing flip-flops
in the Circuit Under Test (CUT) to create an architecture that includes Test Pattern Genera-
tors (TPGs) and Output Response Analyzers (ORAs) [54]. A BILBO can be configured to
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operate as a Multiple Input Signature Register (MISR). MISRs are used in digital systems
test to compress a large number of test outputs into a small “signature” so that pass/fail
comparison logic is greatly reduced and tests are completed more quickly [54].
Figure 2.2 shows four bits of a reconfigurable n-bit BILBO register. The BILBO reg-
ister operates in four modes: (i) a normal parallel load mode, (ii) a shift register with
scan input “Scan In,” (iii) a Multiple Input Signature Register (MISR), and (iv) a Pseudo-
Random Pattern Generator (PRPG) as controlled by the four combinations of bits B1 and
B2 [54].
A MISR is a variation of a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) where multiple
inputs can be input into the LFSR exclusive-or gates prior to each flop-flop as seen in
Figures 2.2 and 2.3. Figure 2.3 shows a four-bit BILBO register configured to operate in
MISR mode [54]. Traditionally, MISRs implement test compression by use of a prede-
termined “primitive polynomial” which results in the MISR generating a small signature
with a very low probability (approximately 1/2n for an n-bit MISR) of two different bit se-
quences producing the same signature [54]. The specific calculation shown in Figure 2.3 is
for the architecture to take inputs In[3:0] and compress the response according to a specific
primitive feedback polynomial – namely, x4 + x + 1 in Figure 2.3 – to form a signature.
There are several published tables with lists of primitive polynomials for multiple MISR
sizes [60–62]. For example, a list of primitive polynomials of degree n for every n < 64 is
provided in [62].
The use of a MISR for signature generation incurs low area overhead since the archi-
tecture takes advantage of existing sequential logic and registers. In particular, for test
purposes, it is common to add a few gates per bit to change a normal register into a BILBO
register as described in [63]. Once the BILBO registers are in the design, we can program
them as shown in Figure 2.3 to operate in MISR mode during run-time.
In addition, use of a MISR for signature generation is much simpler than hashing al-

























































































sufficient number of clock cycles, the probability of appearance of each pattern becomes
1/2n for an n-bit MISR provided that the number of input patterns to the MISR is greater
than one [54]. Thus, for low power applications, the use of MISRs for signatures might be
favorable over higher power and area hash algorithms, especially if the MISR’s primitive
polynomial is carefully chosen.
2.4.3 MISR Encryption
SHA is designed to not give away information about encrypted data to an attacker who
obtains the full set of transmitted bits. If we use MISR logic to generate a signature, it is
not known whether or not the MISR signature could be used as a side channel to break
the encryption. However, some recent work appears to indicate that a suitably modified
MISR (e.g., altered to avoid linearity) may have important hash function properties for
security [64].
A straightforward way to protect a MISR signature is to encrypt it with the same proto-
col used to encrypt the messages. In this work, we use PRESENT which is a low-area, low-
power block-cipher utilizing either an 80-bit key or a 128-bit key [65]. 128-bit PRESENT
has been shown to be as cryptographically secure as 128-bit AES [65].
2.5 Summary
Designing techniques to detect malicious modifications to hardware and software in embed-
ded and medical devices has been a major challenge. Resource, area and power limitations
on such devices impose hard constraints on creating these architectures. In this chapter,
we present some of the major types of HT detection techniques in the literature along with
their corresponding advantages and disadvantages. In addition, we describe some of the
most adopted methods and architectures for detecting run-time code integrity attacks in
embedded systems and highlight the strengths and drawbacks of such architectures.
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CHAPTER 3
HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE THREAT MODELS
3.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses in detail each of the hardware and software threats that are targeted
in this dissertation. We first introduce our main Hardware Trojan (HT) threat scenario
in which an adversary can confiscate the integrity of a user’s data. We then present our
software threat model as it pertains to run-time code integrity by stating the types of vul-
nerabilities and attacks that are addressed by the techniques presented in this work. Finally,
we present the threats that are not currently addressed by the work presented in this disser-
tation.
3.2 Hardware Trojan Threat Model
One of the most interesting classes of HT attacks is the type that stealthily targets the
functionality of a specific digital design via minimal logic insertion. This type of attack
typically relies on a trigger condition as shown in Figure 2.1. In our work, we consider the
threat model shown in Figure 3.1. The HT model, which is representative of most prior
work [28–31, 33], is composed of trigger circuitry and a payload.
As shown in Figure 3.1, the payload can be as small as a single exclusive-or (XOR)
Figure 3.1: Our HT threat model showing trigger circuitry and a payload composed of a
simple XOR gate.
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gate that modifies data on a bus in the design (Input bus signal in this case) by toggling
a single bit (most significant bit in this case). As Figure 3.1 shows, such a type of HT
attack is extremely small (just a few gates) and cannot be reliably detected if hidden among
thousands or even millions of gates in an embedded system design [29]. In addition, the
effect of such an attack could be disastrous if it goes undetected for relatively long periods
of time. For instance, in the example scenario shown in Figure 1.2 and as discussed in
Section 1.2, an attack on the ECG or BCG data could hypothetically cause the adjustment
pumps on such a BCG scale to behave abnormally in a way that could harm the person
standing on the scale.
Figure 3.2 shows an example of trigger circuitry responsible for waiting for an acti-
vation characteristic to trigger the HT. The activation characteristic, as described in Sec-
tion 2.2.1 and as shown in Figure 2.1, can be externally or internally triggered. In our threat
scenario, we consider HT trigger circuitry which is based on a conditionally triggered HT.
As Figure 3.2 shows, the trigger circuitry can be designed using only a counter and minimal
control logic. The counter is attached to a rarely toggling node in the processing block on
the chip. The counter is incremented every time the value on the wire toggles. The control
logic monitors the output of the counter and asserts the trigger once the counter reaches a
specific predefined value.
It is important to note that in our threat model, we assume that once the HT is triggered,
it remains on for a relatively long time. That is because if an attacker wants to intelligently
turn on the HT for finite periods to bypass specific detection techniques, the trigger circuitry
(shown in Figure 3.2) will have to be more complex resulting in an HT with a larger size.
Figure 3.2: An HT trigger circuitry example composed of a rarely toggling node that incre-
ments a counter to set the HT trigger.
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Such types of larger sized HTs are beyond the scope of our work and, as indicated in
Section 2.2.1, can be caught by other HT detection techniques [24–27, 31, 32].
3.2.1 Hardware Trojan Attack Types
In our work, we studied two major classes of the Hardware Trojan threat model described
above, namely, HT attacks that target a single point in the architecture (referred to as “single
attacks”) and HT attacks that target multiple points (referred to as “coordinated attacks”).
3.2.1.1 Single Attacks
This type of HT attack targets a single point in the architecture. The goal behind this type
of attack is to modify the data either as it arrives at the input of the chip or at the output of
any of the internal modules along the data path. The attack attempts to modify the data in
the same way as presented in our threat scenario shown in Figure 3.1. Namely, HT trigger
circuitry is connected to a logic gate, e.g., an exclusive-or gate, such that when the Trojan
is triggered, one bit of the targeted data is complemented resulting in data modification.
Figure 3.3 shows a block diagram of a part of an attacked hardware implementation of
the medical device scenario presented in Section 1.2 and Figure 1.2 where ECG and BCG
data are captured, processed, encrypted and transmitted. The HT attack shown in Figure 3.3
targets a single point in the architecture (HT Payload) by maliciously modifying the input
data as it is being sent to the processor. The HT Trigger module in the design relies on a
logical condition in the hardware encryption unit to be true before triggering the HT.
3.2.1.2 Coordinated Attacks
This type of HT attack attempts to simultaneously target multiple points in the architecture.
The HT trigger circuitry is connected to two payloads. The first payload attempts to ma-
liciously modify the data while the second payload tries to hide the effect of the HT so as
to pass undetected. For example, an HT could try to simultaneously attack the data and the
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Figure 3.3: An example architecture of medical device hardware showing an HT attack
targeting a single point in the design, namely, the input data.
implemented HT detection architecture. If the detection architecture relies on some logic
to assert an alarm signal, the HT, for example, could try to suppress such a signal.
Consider an example scenario similar to the one presented in Figure 3.3 with an imple-
mented HT detection architecture as shown in Figure 3.4. The HT detection architecture
relies on monitoring the data as it flows in the system to detect any anomalies. Once an
anomaly is detected, a signal is sent to the Wifi Chip to disable the transmission of the re-
ceived data. As shown in the Figure 3.4, the HT attack can now consist of an HT trigger
that is simultaneously connected to two payloads. HT Payload 1 performs the same oper-
ation of maliciously modifying the data while HT Payload 2 attacks the decision result of
the HT detection architecture. For example, HT Payload 2 could try to force the decision
to always show normal behavior. In this case, even when the HT detection architecture
detects that HT Payload 1 has maliciously modified the data, its decision is being masked
by HT Payload 2 resulting in the attack passing undetected.
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Figure 3.4: An example architecture of medical device hardware including an HT detection
architecture showing an HT attack targeting a multiple points in the design.
3.3 Run-time Code Integrity Threat Model
Figure 3.5 presents an overview of the software threat model addressed in this work. Specif-
ically, we focus on malware attacks that target and maliciously change executable code at
run-time while the code is present in the memory of an embedded processor. The goal is
to detect these types of attacks and assess the integrity of computation performed by the
central processing unit of a device to ensure correct behavior of a system.
3.3.1 Run-time Attacks
The software threats on which we primarily focus occur after deployment. Therefore, in
our threat model the development environment is assumed to be protected from malicious
alterations. In this dissertation, we do not address attacks prior to run-time as there have
been a plethora of techniques introduced in the literature to help in protecting compile-time
code and allocating secure storage for sensitive information [6, 66].
26
Figure 3.5: An overview of the software threat model showing malware affecting code at
run-time while it is present in the memory of a processor.
3.3.2 Code Injection/Modification Attacks
From the different types of common weaknesses and vulnerabilities described in Sec-
tion 2.3.1, we focus on software attacks that modify user process code or inject new code at
run-time. Therefore, attacks that attempt to modify executable memory contents (e.g., via
buffer overflow and/or code injection/modification) are primary candidates for the types of
vulnerabilities that our work detects. The result of successful code injection attacks can be
disastrous. For example, it can result in data loss or corruption, lack of accountability, or
denial of access and in extreme cases can lead to complete system takeover.
3.3.2.1 Hollow Process Injection or Process Hollowing
Hollow process injection or process hollowing is a variation of the evasive type of code
injection/modification malware [67]. The process hollowing technique used by these types
of malware utilizes a legitimate process that is loaded on the system to act as a container for
hostile code. When the malware is triggered at run-time, it attaches itself to the legitimate
process and replaces the process’ code with malicious code. Examples of some recent mal-
ware that exploited the process hollowing method to inject code into running applications
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are the BadNews Android malware [8] and Stuxnet [68]. This evasive type of malware in-
jection constitutes a major focus of our work. Therefore, our attack model covers the case
of a malware that inserts itself into a system and tries to maliciously inject code into an-
other process to end up modifying the process’s functionality or leak sensitive information.
Attacks of this type are typically performed on the text segment of a process address space
and can target code down to instruction-level modification. Thus, these types of stealthy
malware are hard to detect and prevent since they may be hidden anywhere on the system
or may be inserted at run-time to target a specific embedded systems application.
3.4 Threats not Addressed in this Work
The work presented in this dissertation does not address Hardware Trojan (HT) attacks
that result in the leakage of sensitive information and/or disabling the functionality of a
system [25]. For example, our work does not currently detect an HT attack resulting in
the transmission of secretly stored keys in hardware. Similarly, our work does not target
HT attacks that try to disable a digital chip by momentarily shutting it down to perform
a maliciously desired operation. In addition, HT attacks with a relatively large hardware
footprint are not the major focus of our work since there are plenty of techniques presented
in the literature, such as side-channel analysis and digital systems test techniques, that cover
these types of attacks (refer to Section 2.2.2).
On the software side, the techniques presented in this dissertation do not address the
unchanged executable code portion of return-oriented programming (ROP) attacks or code
reuse attacks where an adversary modifies the behavior of a program by utilizing existing
code in the system to launch their attack; on the other hand, any changes in the executable
code – however small – are addressed by this thesis [69, 70]. In addition, our presented and
implemented architecture does not currently support Just-in-Time (JIT) compilation where
executable code is generated and modified at run-time [71]. Moreover, attacks on the exe-
cutable processes’ page addresses and attacks that end up leaking confidential information
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without modifying the pages’ contents are currently out of the scope of this work.
3.5 Summary
This chapter presents in detail the different classes of hardware and software attacks that
are targeted by our work. Specifically, we focus on extremely small HTs in embedded
medical devices which when triggered attempt to modify the functionality of the design. In
addition, our work targets software attacks that end up maliciously modifying application




HARDWARE TROJAN DETECTION USING HARDWARE SIGNATURES
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an embedded systems HT detection architecture that combines mul-
tiple novel HT detection techniques [19–22]. Our architecture is motivated by the health
monitoring scenario presented in Section 1.2 and targets the HT threat model described in
Section 3.2. Specifically, our technique detects HT attacks that are extremely small in size
and which, once triggered, attempt to modify the functionality of the chip by attacking the
user’s health data. The captured ECG and BCG data have known relationships which we
take advantage of to create multiple types of signatures that check for the data’s integrity
at run-time. We embed different techniques of signature generation deep in the hardware
(during data harvesting), and then we check for the validity of these signatures during dig-
ital processing to ensure that the chip has no HT attacks and that the data’s integrity is
maintained.
Therefore, this chapter covers novel detection mechanisms used to detect malicious
hardware modifications that result in corrupting a user’s data as it is being captured in
real-time. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents an overall
introduction to our HT detection architecture. Sections 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 discuss in detail the
three different techniques used for signature generation and testing. Section 4.6 discusses
combining the three different types of signature generation and testing mechanisms and
highlights the advantages of doing so. Section 4.7 presents a modification to our architec-
ture to help detect coordinated HT attacks that target multiple points in a design. Finally, a
summary is drawn in Section 4.8.
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4.2 Architecture Overview
To target extremely small HT attacks that maliciously modify data as it is captured and
processed by digital microchips (see our threat scenario presented in Section 3.2), we devise
an architectural level solution where we split our design into two separate chips. Our
approach is similar in principal to the concepts presented in [72, 73] where a prover and
verifier are used together to verify correct execution on a chip. However, our work relies
on checking the integrity of the data as opposed to verifying the full specifications of the
hardware components. The premise is that for data integrity there is no need to verify
every single specification in a hardware design as long as we can guarantee with a high
probability that the actual output of our design is as expected. Figure 4.1 shows an overview
of our presented architecture. Our method relies on the idea of generating different types
of signatures during data harvesting by sensors and then checking for these signatures later
during data processing and encryption.
The left chip in Figure 4.1 represents our first chip or “Chip 1.” This chip is responsi-
ble for performing analog-to-digital conversion and initial signature generation. Thus, we
assume that Chip 1 can use older technologies and can be fabricated in a trusted fab (for
example, where employees have security clearances). In our design, we choose to create
two types of signatures, a digital signature and an analog-based signature. The two created
signatures in Chip 1 along with the captured data are then passed on to Chip 2 in Figure 4.1.
Chip 2 is responsible for data processing, data encryption, and signature regeneration
and testing. Specifically, in this work we perform up to three types of signature checks:
digital, analog and physiological-based signature testing. Alarm signals are generated out
of each of these signature testing mechanisms. The alarm signals are used to inform up-
per level firmware or software of any potential health problem or hardware attack/error.
Chip 2 is assumed to be fabricated using a state-of-the-art process node, usually by another























































































































of such a chip. Thus, we consider that an HT can be injected into any part of this chip
including the primary inputs. To detect such types of HT attacks, including ones that tar-
get the signature testing logic, it was reasonable for us to embed our signature generation
and testing mechanisms in reconfigurable logic providing the fabrication company with no
information regarding how to insert HTs and allowing for the flexibility in terms of tailor-
ing the testing mechanisms to the application’s security needs over the course of the chip’s
lifetime.
Incorporating signature generation and testing deep in the hardware provides several
advantages. First, it enables checking the integrity of the data as early as possible. Second,
it improves the security of the overall embedded system design by further complicating the
job of a potential malicious entity. Finally, having multiple signature generation techniques
– i.e., digital, analog and physiological-based signatures – helps in complicating the job
of an attacker and in improving the analysis and decision making of our architecture. In
fact, simultaneously issuing multiple alarm signals by three independent types of signature
generation techniques reduces the false positives and more importantly the false negatives
of our approach.
In the following sections, we introduce and describe the details of each of our signa-
ture generation and testing mechanisms. We start by describing the details of the digital
signature generation and testing in Section 4.3, followed by the analog signature genera-
tion and testing in Section 4.4, ending with the details of the physiological-based signature
generation and testing in Section 4.5.
4.3 Digital Signatures
The first type of signature generation and testing mechanism utilized in our architecture is
based on a digital form of hardware signatures. As mentioned in Section 2.4, signatures
can be generated using different techniques and algorithms (HMACs, CBC-MACs, MISRs,
etc.). A selected hardware implementation of one of these signature generation algorithms
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is used to compress multiple sets of sensor data to initially create a golden signature and
later assess the integrity of the captured data by checking against the created signature.
In our work, we choose to implement MISRs as our digital signature generators for their
advantage in terms of area and energy consumption over MACs and specifically SHA as
shown in Section 2.4. The following subsections describe in detail the part of the architec-
ture responsible for generating the digital MISR signature in Chip 1 and the testing for that
signature in Chip 2 to detect malicious hardware modifications.
4.3.1 Chip 1: A/D Conversion and Digital Signature Generation
Figure 4.2 shows a more detailed block diagram of the part responsible for generating the
digital signature from the sensor data in Chip 1 or the left chip in Figure 4.1. In this work,
we use the BCG force that is along the vertical direction, i.e., the BCG Head-to-Foot (HF)
signal, along with the ECG signal. ECG and BCG HF sensor inputs are first passed through
analog to digital (A/D) converters before being momentarily stored into First-In-First-Out
(FIFO) buffers. The FIFO buffers are 16 bits wide and two slots deep giving the ability
for every FIFO to store two consecutive sets of sensor inputs. The output of every FIFO
is concatenated to form 32-bit blocks which are in turn concatenated to form a single 64-
bit block. The resulting 64-bit block is fed into a MISR [19, 33]. The MISR receives 64
consecutive 64-bit blocks and compresses them into a single 64-bit signature (shown as
Signature 1 in Figure 4.2). Signature 1 along with the sensor data are passed on to Chip 2.
Figure 4.2: A closer look at the logic design that generates the digital (MISR) signature in
the first chip.
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4.3.2 Chip 2: Digital Signature Testing and Data Processing
Figure 4.3 presents a closer look at the components present in Chip 2 (see Figure 4.1). First,
the digital sensor data coming from Chip 1 are concatenated to form a 64-bit block. Second,
every block is encrypted using an encryption cipher, such as PRESENT [65], to generate
the ciphertext (CT in Figure 4.3). Third, the encrypted data is passed through a decryption
cipher to regenerate the sensor data plaintext (PT in Figure 4.3). PT regeneration helps
in detecting HT attacks and hardware errors in the encryption and decryption ciphers [19,
33]. Namely, if the PT is directly used for signature regeneration, an HT attack on the
encryption or decryption cipher will not affect the regenerated signature and thus the attack
goes undetected. Fourth, the PT is fed through the MISR signature generator to regenerate
the digital signature (Signature 2 in Figure 4.3). Finally, Signature 1, the signature coming
in from Chip 1, is compared to Signature 2 to check for any HT attacks or hardware errors
in Chip 2. The result of the comparison is fed to a release logic block (right hand side
of Figure 4.3) which is responsible for releasing the encrypted data upon success of the
comparison. The alarm signal indicates the presence of a potential HT attack or error.
It is important to note that for the signatures that we consider (MISR signatures), we
are not aware of known techniques (under the considered threat scenario of extremely small
HTs) to quickly compute how a change to an input bit would affect the associated signature.
Specifically, since we embed HT detection (MISR signature generation and testing) in re-
configurable logic, it appears infeasible for an HT to simultaneously change both the input
and the signature in a way that would avoid detection, especially given that the primitive
polynomial of the BILBO MISR (Figure 2.3) is not yet placed in the chip hardware logic at
fabrication time. Therefore, the MISR signature is accepted to have properties that do not
fully satisfy ones of a cryptographic signature. However, if the application requires higher
security guarantees, a designer could opt to use a much more secure signature generation

























































In addition to compressing multiple ECG and BCG HF samples into a digital MISR sig-
nature in Chip 1 of Figure 4.1, we create an analog relationship between every ECG and
BCG HF data set sample. We then digitize the created analog signature and pass it along
with the MISR signature and the data to Chip 2 in our architecture. The following sub-
sections describe in detail the creation of the analog signature in Chip 1 and the testing of
this signature in Chip 2 to better help in detecting HT attacks and unintentional hardware
errors.
4.4.1 Chip 1: A/D Conversion and Analog Signature Generation
Figure 4.4 shows an example of a detailed view of the architecture responsible for the
generation of an analog signature in Chip 1 in Figure 4.1. First, ECG and BCG HF data
harvested from sensors are amplified and filtered to improve the signal-to-noise ratio of the
captured data. Second, the filtered data is fed to analog-to-digital converters and prepared to
be passed to Chip 2 for encryption and further processing. At the same time, the harvested
sensor data are passed through an analog signature generation logic.
In our approach, we create an analog signature using the vector sum (i.e., square root
of the sum of the squares of the ECG and BCG measurements) of the captured data as
shown in the bottom right-hand side of Figure 4.4. One of the major reasons behind using
the vector sum as an analog signature is its importance in analyzing and diagnosing health
problems in heart monitoring medical devices [74, 75]. Therefore, we take advantage of
the need for such calculations to improve the security by using it to check for the integrity
of the captured sensor data. In addition, the simplicity and the abundance of the major
components (adders, squarers and square root modules) [76] needed to perform such a
























































Finally, the created analog signature is fed into an analog-to-digital converter and passed
on to Chip 2 along with ECG and BCG sensor data.
4.4.2 Chip 2: Analog-based Signature Testing and Data Processing
Figure 4.5 shows a detailed view of the architecture in Chip 2 responsible for the generation
of a digital version of the analog signature and its comparison against the digitized golden
analog signature coming from Chip 1.
Similar to the process described in Section 4.3.2, the ECG and BCG data coming in
from Chip 1 are concatenated to form 64-bit blocks that are in turn encrypted and de-
crypted using the PRESENT encryption and decryption ciphers respectively. However, the
decrypted data in this case are split back into four 16-bit registers. Each two registers hold
two consecutive sets of ECG and BCG data. The control unit in Chip 2 schedules the pas-
sage of each set of data through the multipliers and adders to regenerate a digital version of
the vector sum. Specifically, the first ECG data set is passed through the 16-bit multiplier
where the data is squared and saved in a register. Then, the first BCG data set is passed
through the multiplier to be squared and then added to the squared ECG data using a 16-bit
adder. The generated result is denoted as Signature 2 in Figure 4.5. It is to be noted that
since the analog chip is sampling the BCG data using 16-bit analog-to-digital converters,
the 32-bit result of the multiplier is truncated and the most significant 16-bits of the result
are used as inputs to the next stage. The loss of precision in generating the analog-based
signature using 16-bit multipliers directly affects the application at hand. In our case, the
health monitoring application requires an accuracy of only four significant digits after the
decimal. Thus, the need for 14 bits to represent the fractional part of the value is enough
for this application.
Synchronously, the analog-based signature coming from Chip 1 is passed through a 16-
bit multiplier acting as a squarer to generate the squared value of the vector sum (sum of
















































































in Figure 4.5. Signature 1 and Signature 2 are then compared to determine if an HT attack
or hardware error has happened anywhere in the second chip (Chip 2). Similar to what
is shown in Figure 4.3, the result of the comparison is fed into a release logic block to
determine whether the encrypted data can be safely transferred out of the chip. If the
comparison fails, an alarm signal is raised indicating a potential HT attack or error.
It is to be noted that the comparator logic for the analog-based signature testing, shown
in Figure 4.5, behaves in a slightly different fashion than the one used with digital-based
signature testing, shown in Figure 4.3. In this case, the comparator logic performs the
following:
• if (|Signature1− Signature2| ≤ threshold)
declare a match
• if (|Signature1− Signature2| > threshold)
declare a mismatch
where threshold is an input set by the user due to the analog nature of the applica-
tion and the signature. To reduce the rate of false positives introduced by the analog-based
vector sum signature comparison, the threshold register is typically monitored during a
learning period for every individual and is adjusted according to the person’s data. The
threshold is however limited by the accuracy needed by the application at hand. For ex-
ample, if the application cannot tolerate any difference between the analog-based signature
and the regenerated signature, the false positive rate would drastically increase due to the
architecture flagging a possible HT attack when in fact the difference is due to the rounding
of the analog signature. Thus, for this signature generation technique a compromise has to
be made between relaxing the threshold and detecting attacks targeting the least significant
bits of the signature.
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4.5 Physiological Features-based Signatures
The third type of signature generation and testing discussed in this chapter revolves around
extracting physiological features that help in detecting anomalies in users’ health data.
The extracted features provide some known relationships between the captured data. Our
technique utilizes these known relationships to detect HT attacks or unintentional hardware
errors in the design.
4.5.1 ECG and BCG Feature Extraction
In this work, we extract two main features from the ECG and BCG HF data, namely,
the heart rate and an approximation of the R-J interval [14, 15, 18, 74]. The heart rate
can be calculated by finding the heart beat period which is the elapsed time between two
consecutive ECG peaks (R-peaks). The R-J interval is defined as the elapsed time between
the previous ECG R-peak and the global maximum (J-peak) in the first 400 ms of the
BCG HF signal [77]. Since in this work the BCG HF data coming from the force-plate
is amplified using an inverting amplifier, the J-peak in such data corresponds to the global
minimum found in the same time period.
Figure 4.6 shows a sample recording of the ECG and BCG HF signals. Figure 4.6 also
marks the features that we use in our architecture. In fact, the hardware needed to extract
these features can be considered part of the design since these features are often used to
analyze a person’s physiological health [14, 15, 18, 78].
4.5.2 Hardware Peak Detection
The hardware implementation of our physiological-based signature generation technique
requires accurately extracting features and relationships between the ECG and BCG HF
data. Specifically, an important part of the feature extraction circuitry relies on accurately
detecting peaks in the data as it flows through our architecture; thus, we implemented a
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Figure 4.6: Using ECG and BCG Head-to-Foot (HF) Data to extract a person’s heart rate
and R-J interval values.
hardware efficient and accurate peak detector developed by Jordanov and Hall [79].
Figure 4.7 shows a block diagram of the digital peak detector that we use. This digital
peak detector combines noise immunity and speed of peak detection. It operates in two
modes: (i) tracking maximum and (ii) tracking minimum. A maximum value is stored
when transitioning from tracking maximum mode to tracking minimum mode. Similarly,
a minimum value is captured when transitioning from tracking minimum mode to tracking
maximum mode.
The peak register (PREG) in Figure 4.7 is used to track and capture the minimum/maxi-
mum value. The peak detection is controlled by the output value of the comparator. Since
ECG and BCG data are captured by sensors, the signals are typically coupled with noise.
Thus, to improve the accuracy of the peak detection, a noise threshold value is set in the
architecture. The noise threshold register holds the acceptable noise theshold value for the
application at hand. It is used along with its negated value to improve the accuracy by
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Figure 4.7: Peak detection circuitry with noise immunity and fast detection of maxima and
minima [79].
eliminating peaks that are lower than the threshold. This is established by the use of the
16-bit subtractor and the comparator.
On the one hand, when the peak detector is operating in the tracking maximum mode,
the PREG value is latched in the Max latch. On the other hand, when the peak detector
is operating in the tracking minimum mode, the PREG value is latched in the Min latch.
Finally, the sign bit of the subtractor’s output exclusive-ored (XOR) with the output of
the comparator act as the enable signal of the peak register (PREG) allowing for proper
tracking of minimum and maximum values [79]. The tracked minimum and maximum
values will be used in our architecture to extract the different physiological features and
relationships between the ECG and BCG data.
4.5.3 Physiological Feature Extraction Hardware
As opposed to the digital and analog based signature generation and testing techniques, the
physiological-based signature generation and testing technique does not require a signature
generation phase in Chip 1 in Figure 4.1. Instead, this technique extracts features (signa-
tures) only in Chip 2 and relies on the known physiological properties of these features to
check for anomalies in the circuit that affect the integrity of the data.








































































































testing for the physiological-based signatures in Chip 2 of our design. As with the previous
two techniques, sensor data (ECG and BCG HF data) coming into Chip 2 are first encrypted
and decrypted using the PRESENT encryption/decryption cipher. Then the decrypted data
is pre-processed to improve its signal-to-noise ratio for a better feature extraction. The
concatenated sets of ECG and BCG data are split back into sets of 16-bit signals. The ECG
and BCG data sets are then used to extract the two main physiological features, namely, the
heart rate and the R-J interval [14, 15, 18, 74, 77].
4.5.3.1 Heart Rate Extraction
The ECG heart rate is generated as follows. First, the ECG_data is passed through the
peak detector described in Section 4.5.2 and shown in Figure 4.7. The peak detector out-
puts a maximum or a minimum value whenever a peak is detected. It also outputs a signal
(peak_detected) indicating if a peak is detected. Second, this signal is passed through a
Max Peak Detector logic block to validate that the detected peak is a maximum and not a
minimum. When this is the case, the Max_peak_detected signal is set. Simultaneously, the
Max value output by the peak detector is compared (Comparator 1) with a predefined ECG
Peak Threshold stored in a register. If the Max value is higher than the threshold, the com-
parator’s output is set to a logic ‘1’ value. Third, the comparator’s output is ANDed with
the Max_peak_detected signal to create a reset for a 12-bit counter. The 12-bit counter is
used to count the number of samples between two consecutive R-peaks of the ECG signal.
Finally, whenever an R-peak is found, the output of the AND gate is set to one resulting in
the storage of the value of the counter in a register and the reset of the counter back to zero.
The value stored in the counter denotes a heart beat period which is a representative of the
measured heart rate.
The generated ECG heart rate is compared (Comparator 2) with normal values of ECG
heart rates to generate and set an alarm signal when an anomaly is detected.
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4.5.3.2 R-J Interval Extraction
The R-J interval is extracted as follows. The BCG_HF_data is passed through an instanti-
ation of the peak detector to look for minimum values in the data. The Min value generated
by the peak detector is connected to a register and Comparator 3 to store the lowest Min
value found so far. This is done by connecting Comparator 3’s output to the register’s
enable signal. The comparator’s output is set to a logic ‘1’ whenever the new Min value
is lower than the previously stored Min value in the register. The register’s reset signal is
connected to the output of the AND gate (from the ECG part of the chip) so that the register
is reset whenever an ECG R-peak is encountered.
Comparator 3’s output in Figure 4.8 is also used to store the counter value coming from
the ECG part of the chip in the register labeled “CREG.” This will lead to the storage of the
interval between an R-peak in the ECG signal and the current global minimum in the BCG
HF signal. To obtain the correct representative value of the R-J interval, the stored value of
the counter (in CREG) is not used unless it is confirmed to be the global minimum within
the first 400 ms of the BCG HF signal. To perform this function, Comparator 4 is used
to compare the ECG_counter_value to a predefined interval register value representing
400ms. Once the ECG counter reaches the interval register’s value, Comparator 4’s output
is set and the R-J interval is stored in the output register (OREG).
To monitor the variation in the R-J interval values, a second register (VREG) is used
such that the two registers, OREG and VREG, contain the current and the previous values of
the R-J interval respectively. The values of these two registers are subtracted using a 16-bit
subtractor to determine the variation between consecutive values. In a normal scenario, this
variation should not exceed a predefined value [74, 77]. Comparator 5 uses preset values
found in the Normal ECG to BCG Rate Variation register to check for this phenomenon
and triggers an alarm whenever this phenomenon is violated.
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4.5.4 Alarm Signal Severity
As shown in Figure 4.8, the physiological-feature based signature generation and testing
architecture generates two alarm signals, namely, Alarm_signal_1 and Alarm_ signal_2.
The nature of these two alarm signals differs from the ones generated by both the digital-
based signature testing architecture and the analog-based one described in Sections 4.3
and 4.4 respectively. The physiological-based alarm signals indicate one of three status
values: “no anomaly,” “anomaly” with high fidelity, and possibility of an anomaly which
is referred to in our work as the “gray zone” [20].
Determining the severity of the alarm signals depends on the different ranges of the
extracted features based on physiology and as reported in the literature [77, 80]. However, it
is to be noted that varying these ranges affects the rate of false positives and false negatives
generated by our architecture. The decision of which precise range values to place in our
architecture is up to the user. Determination of range values is beyond the scope of this
work.
The “anomaly” with high fidelity is set when the comparison of the generated feature’s
value with the normal predefined values shows a large mismatch. For example, Alarm_sig-
nal_1 indicates an anomaly when the value of a resting heart rate goes below 30 bpm (beats
per minute) or beyond 130 bpm [80]. Similarly, Alarm_signal_2 indicates an anomaly
when the variation in the R-J interval values exceeds 50% [18]. The no anomaly status is
set when the generated feature’s value falls within the preset normal range of values. For
example, if the calculated heart rate for a resting person falls between 45 bpm and 110 bpm,
Alarm_signal_1 declares a “no anomaly” status [80]. Similarly, Alarm_signal_2 reports a
“no anomaly” status when the variation in the R-J interval values is below 15% [18].
If the comparison of the generated feature’s value with the predefined normal values
falls in a range between the “anomaly” and “no anomaly” levels, the alarm signal declares
a “gray zone” status. For example, Alarm_signal_1 indicates a “gray zone” status when the
resting heart rate of a person falls between 30 bpm and 45 bpm or between 110 bpm and
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130 bpm [80]. Alarm_signal_2 declares a “gray zone” status when the variation in the R-J
interval values is between 15% and 50% [18].
4.6 Combining Digital, Analog and Physiological Based Signatures
One of the important aspects of our design is its complimentary nature where it can be
applied in parallel with other HT detection techniques. In this section, we show that the
techniques introduced in Section 4.2 can be all combined together into one architecture to
not only detect HT attacks and hardware errors in medical devices, but also distinguish
them from health problems. Similarly, other types of signature generation techniques can
be seamlessly integrated into our architecture if needed.
The modified block diagrams of Chip 1 and Chip 2 of our overall design are shown in
Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 respectively. Figure 4.9 shows that Chip 1 has to be slightly
modified to combine both the analog and digital initial signature generation. Specifically,
FIFO buffers are introduced to store multiple sets of data. The stored sets of data are
then passed through a BILBO MISR block to create the MISR-based signature (digital
signature) which is passed along with the analog-based signature (vector sum of the ECG
and BCG HF data) to Chip 2.
Figure 4.10 shows the detailed architecture of Chip 2 where the signatures are checked
to verify the integrity of the data before transmission. First, the ECG and BCG HF data
are encrypted and decrypted; then, the resulting plaintext is used to generate all three types
of signatures, the digital, analog and physiological-based ones. Thus, the release logic is
now controlled by multiple alarm signals coming from two types of signature comparators
(Comparator Logic 1 and Comparator Logic 2 in Figure 4.10) and from the heart rate
and R-J interval feature extraction circuitry. Comparator Logic 1 in Figure 4.10 validates
the digital-based signature (MISR), and Comparator Logic 2 validates the integrity of the
analog-based signature (vector sum).




















































































































































important for specific types of HT attacks and increases the security level of the archi-
tecture by allowing for smarter decisions when analyzing the results of multiple signature
generation techniques. In addition, the incorporation of signature comparison (for both
digital and analog-based signatures) along with physiological feature extraction helps in
distinguishing HT attacks or other hardware errors from health problems.
To better show the analysis of the different alarm signals of Figure 4.10, we present in
Table 4.1 some plausible decisions that could be taken upon looking at the combination of
all alarm signals in the architecture. For example, an HT attack modifying low order bits of
the BCG HF data and the analog-based signature might go undetected in the architecture
shown in Figure 4.5. However, for an architecture where even detection of such changes to
low order bits are needed, adding the MISR-based HT detection approach may be desirable,
especially if the digital systems test structures already include BILBO logic which can be
reconfigured for use in HT detection. Adding the MISR-based HT detection would help in
detecting an attack on any of the data bits as the authors are unaware of any publication that
shows a way of simultaneously modifying the data bits and the MISR-based signature with-
out being caught [19, 33]. As shown in Table 4.1, even when the analog-based signature
module indicates a match, if both the digital and physiological-based signature modules
indicate a mismatch, the architecture can then guarantee that an anomaly is present in the
system.
Another example that benefits from the incorporation of the analog, digital and physio-
logical-based approaches is the case of an HT attack on the ECG and BCG HF data inputs
in the architecture of Figure 4.10. Suppose the HT were to consist of some minimal logic
to swap the values of the ECG and BCG HF signals. This type of specific attack will go
undetected by the sole use of the analog-based signature detection approach. However,
since the MISR-based signatures are created by compressing each ECG and BCG HF data
component independently and not by generating a relation between the two components,



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Finally, as Table 4.1 shows, the combination of the three techniques not only improves
the decision making in whether an anomaly is present in the circuit, but also helps in iden-
tifying whether the anomaly is due to an actual hardware attack/error or due to a health
problem that the individual is having. For example, if both the analog and digital-based
techniques indicate a match while the physiological-based feature extraction circuitry in-
dicates an anomaly, the person is asked to seek immediate medical help indicating a high
possibility of a serious health problem.
It is important to note that in this work our architecture focuses only on creating means
of detecting HT attacks, hardware errors and/or health problems by asserting alarm signals
when the respective conditions are believed to be present. The decisions and countermea-
sures to such types of attacks or errors are kept to be processed and analyzed by higher
level policies and protocols.
In addition, since our techniques rely on the correctness of signature generation and
comparison, it is worth mentioning the chip aging effects on the reliability of our approach.
The analog-based vector sum and the physiological-based signature generation architec-
tures already implement threshold registers due to the inherent variations in the values of
these signatures. These threshold register values can be calibrated as the chip ages to com-
pensate for signature changes over time. However, the MISR-based signature generation
presents a more challenging scenario since single bit flips would generate false positives.
Techniques used to address the aging effects in hardware implementations of hashing algo-
rithms and PUFs, such as the use of error detection and correction, could be added to our
architecture to compensate for chip aging [81].
4.7 Defending Against Coordinated Attacks
The architecture presented in Figure 4.10 does not detect all types of coordinated HT at-
tacks. For instance, consider an example of a coordinated HT attack targeting our devel-
oped architecture as shown Figure 4.11. The HT’s trigger circuitry is connected to two
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Figure 4.11: An HT attacking both an internal data bus in the design and the output of a
comparator.
payloads. The first payload (Payload 1 in Figure 4.11) affects the architecture in the same
way as discussed earlier in our threat model in Section 3.2 as well as in Figure 3.1. The sec-
ond payload (Payload 2 in Figure 4.11), which is triggered at the same time, attempts to set
the output of the comparator logic to a fixed value indicating a matched comparison. This
way, even if the data is altered resulting in an altered regenerated signature, the comparator
will still indicate a success in the comparison and the attack will go undetected.
To prevent such a type of attack, for every comparator in the design we insert a module
in reconfigurable logic, the comparator testing logic block (Figure 4.12), to specifically
Figure 4.12: A comparator testing logic unit inserted to verify the correct operation of a
comparator and detect any HT attacks that attempt to alter the comparator’s result.
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check for the attack’s effect on the comparator. The comparator testing logic periodically
checks for the expected behavior of the comparator by asserting a test mode signal as shown
in Figure 4.12. In this way, the regenerated signature is intentionally modified and the re-
sult of the comparison is checked. If the comparator indicates a match, then we know with
a high fidelity that the comparator is under attack. When the test mode signal is deasserted,
the regenerated signature is passed without any alteration and the circuit behaves normally.
It is worth mentioning that for energy constrained embedded and medical systems, such as
battery-powered devices, extensive testing might not be feasible and thus the comparator
testing logic might be simplified or completely removed. An alternative could be to di-
rectly embed the comparators in reconfigurable logic to strengthen the architecture against
HT attacks that attempt to provide a workaround against our designed signature checking
technique.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter, we present a novel two-chip architecture for detecting malicious hard-
ware modifications at run-time in medical devices through the use of hardware signatures.
Specifically, our architecture is designed to detect extremely small HTs in embedded med-
ical devices which when triggered attempt to modify the functionality of the design. Three
different techniques for signature generation are developed, namely, analog, digital and
physiological-based signatures, by taking advantage of known relationships between health
sensor data. In addition, we present a modification to our designed architecture to detect
coordinated HT attacks that target multiple points in a design.
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CHAPTER 5
RUN-TIME CODE INTEGRITY ARCHITECTURE
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present a hardware-assisted technique to detect malicious software ac-
tivities that end up modifying executable code at run-time [23]. Specifically, our technique
performs binary code analysis and page-based signature (hash) generation of critical appli-
cations running on an embedded system to ensure the integrity of computation performed
by a medical device. We perform run-time memory monitoring through a separate and iso-
lated hardware monitor that performs on-the-fly page-based hash generation and testing.
Malicious modifications to running executable code are rapidly caught and flagged, e.g., to
the operating system (OS), indicating the presence of abnormal behavior.
The remaining sections of this chapter are divided as follows. Section 5.2 presents our
approach and methodology. Details of our implementation and target architecture along
with the associated challenges are presented in Section 5.3. In addition, Sections 5.2.3
and 5.3.2 show how our architecture modification for assessing kernel-level process in-
tegrity on top of user-level process integrity provides a more robust implementation and
guarantees that attacks on critical kernel-level modules are detected in real-time. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in the summary in Section 5.4.
5.2 Overall Approach and Method
To protect a process running on an operating system such as Linux, we present an archi-
tectural approach composed of a hardware monitor that is tightly coupled with the physical
memory of a processor as shown in Figure 5.1. Our approach involves generating hashes
of the monitored process’s executable pages at compile-time and storing them in a secure
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Figure 5.1: Our novel process integrity approach showing a hardware monitor tightly cou-
pled to a processor’s physical memory.
location to be later compared to run-time generated hashes during process execution. Our
approach aims to provide a dynamic way of assessing system process integrity while main-
taining isolation from software and corresponding software vulnerabilities.
5.2.1 Detailed Approach
Figure 5.1 shows a conceptual view of our hardware/software codesign approach imple-
mented at the memory interface with the hardware modules used in our architecture to
capture evidence of malicious code execution at run-time. We tightly couple the hardware
monitor to the physical memory of a processor to periodically perform memory probing
through page-based code analysis. After the compile-time generation of the pages’ golden
hashes, the kernel informs the hardware monitor once an application is scheduled to run on
the processor. The hardware monitor communicates with the kernel to extract the desired
running process’s information and state. In addition, the monitor is given full access to the
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physical memory where it is able to read the contents of the process’s loaded pages. In our
work, we focus only on executable pages; therefore, data segments and unmapped regions
within a page are zeroed out before any compile-time or run-time hash generation happens.
It is important to note that the hardware monitor only requires read access to the memory,
and thus if writes are disabled it is not possible to corrupt the memory through hardware
probing.
5.2.2 Methodology
To better understand the overall process starting from the preparation of the golden hashes
to the verification of code integrity at run-time, we present the flow of our technique in
Figure 5.2. The overall method is divided into two general phases, (i) a compile-time phase
and (ii) a run-time phase.
Figure 5.2: The flow of our presented approach where golden hashes of process pages are
generated at compile-time and then checked during run-time to verify the integrity of the
running process.
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During the compilation phase and after the target process has been compiled into its
equivalent binary, the executable code of the process is partitioned into pages as defined in
its Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) file [82]. The content of every page (4 KB) is
hashed using a secure cryptographic algorithm to generate a golden signature of the page
(in the case of the Secure Hash Algorithm SHA256, the generated hash is a bitstream of
256 bits). Due to the avalanche effect provided by the cryptographic algorithm, any bit
change in the page content will result in a significant change in the generated hash of that
specific page. The generated hashes are stored and indexed into a database in a secure and
trusted location (e.g., a software or hardware root-of-trust [66]).
At run-time, when the process is loaded into memory, the kernel notifies the hardware
monitor of the process pages’ locations in memory. This is accomplished by inserting a
monitoring kernel process that extracts the memory maps of the target process and trans-
lates the virtual addresses of the pages to their corresponding physical addresses and page
frame numbers (PFNs) before sending them to the hardware through a communication port
set up between the hardware monitor and the kernel. Once the hardware is aware of the
locations of the process’s executable pages, the monitor grabs the content of every page uti-
lizing a direct memory access (DMA) controller. The content of each page is then passed
through a hardware (HW) crypto-engine, and a run-time hash of the page is generated. The
newly generated hash is compared to the same page’s golden hash as retrieved from secure
storage. Currently, the comparison is performed by string matching. However, if faster
implementations are required, it is possible to consider techniques that only look for sim-
ilarities between the golden and regenerated hashes especially since a single bit change in
the page contents will result in a significant change in the regenerated hash. The process of
regenerating and comparing hashes happens in the hardware monitor and thus is immune
to any of the software attack types defined in our threat model (see Section 3.3).
To allow for continuous monitoring, the hardware monitor’s control unit periodically
restarts the operation of hash regeneration and comparison once all the process pages have
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been checked. In addition, to allow for the protection of multiple applications from ma-
licious code modification, the hardware monitor also checks for OS context switches. If
the OS starts the execution of any one of the monitored processes, the hardware monitor
will similarly grab the code contents of the newly scheduled process, one page at a time,
and check for the corresponding pages’ integrity. If at any point the comparison between
the run-time regenerated hash and the stored golden hash of any page fails, the hardware
monitor triggers an alarm by trapping into the kernel to indicate an integrity violation in
the running application.
5.2.3 Kernel Process Integrity Extension
Our approach is scalable and can be expanded to provide assessment of kernel-level pro-
cess integrity. In that scenario, a dedicated memory has to be attached to the hardware as
shown in Figure 5.3, providing an embedded hardware root of trust. In addition, the ded-
icated hardware monitor is allowed to interface with and access the kernel address space
Figure 5.3: A modified architecture to support kernel process protection.
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in memory to read and scan kernel-level processes’ pages. Thus, our architecture is now
able to check the integrity of specific kernel modules by performing the same technique of
hash regeneration and checking at run-time. Of specific interest is our introduced security
kernel-level driver which is responsible for interfacing between the kernel and the hardware
monitor. In addition, it is imperative to protect kernel-level processes that perform mem-
ory management and page mapping/allocation from potential malicious code modification
attacks as these kernel-level processes and drivers all play an integral role in our presented
code integrity security model.
5.3 Implementation and Target Architecture
To implement our approach in an embedded system, we target a generic architecture sim-
ilar to the one shown in Figure 5.4. Our presented approach is implemented in custom
hardware and interfaces directly with the processor and its main memory. The operating
system running on the processor is modified to include a kernel-level driver that interfaces
with our custom hardware. In turn, the custom hardware includes components that control
the interface with the processor and allow for direct memory access to the main memory
and cache. In addition, the hardware is responsible for generating run-time hashes of the
process pages, comparing the hashes to the golden references and interrupting the kernel in
the case of a hash mismatch.
It is noteworthy to mention that the custom hardware could be an Application Specific
Integrated Circuit (ASIC) or a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). Obviously, each
Figure 5.4: A generic embedded systems architecture of our presented approach.
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of the different architectures provide distinct advantages and disadvantages. For example,
implementing our presented technique on an ASIC chip would provide faster hardware
components at the expense of the modularity provided by FPGAs. In particular, having our
architecture implemented on an FPGA provides the ability to perform different architec-
tural decisions such as choosing different hashing algorithms during a product’s lifetime
depending on the needed security of the application.
Implementing our approach on a target architecture such as the one shown in Figure 5.4
with a target ARM processor running Linux presents some challenges. We highlight these
challenges along with some of the assumptions we take in our target architecture in the
following subsections.
5.3.1 Assumptions and Challenges
Our architecture aims to maintain system integrity after the system boots. Specifically,
our presented approach is complementary to other techniques that ensure a secure boot
process is performed. Thus, we assume that the target processor and operating system
boot into a trusted known state before applications start running. In addition, we initially
assume that the kernel has varying degrees of protection from attacks, and then we relax
these assumptions by expanding our architecture to perform run-time detection of malicious
code modifications to kernel processes as well (see Section 5.2.3). For example, we first
assume that the kernel has a high to medium level of assurance of some kernel processes
that perform basic tasks such as scheduling, memory allocation, etc. Moreover, we assume
that the hardware underneath the operating system is secure and has been provisioned by a
system integrator. Finally, our presented architecture assumes that the kernel can be slightly
modified to interact with our hardware module to ensure access to information regarding
running processes such as memory maps, compiler, linker and loader information.
To accommodate the implementation of our architecture alongside the Linux operat-
ing system, our work is adapted to comply with challenges pertaining to the Linux memory
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management and virtual memory implementation [82, 83]. For example, details of the exact
locations of the executable code including shared library code are implemented. In addi-
tion, different types of linking code executables are taken into consideration. For instance,
our implementation of the presented security architecture is modified to seamlessly accom-
modate both static and dynamic linking. Finally, our technique takes into consideration
the implementation of our architecture on embedded systems with Address Space Layout
Randomization (ASLR) including caches and their associated coherency protocols [84].
5.3.1.1 Linux Memory Management and Process Memory Address Space
After a successful compilation of a target application, the generated executable (ELF) file
of the application is scanned (see Figure 5.5). The program and section header tables in
the ELF file are analyzed to extract the application’s executable pages which need to be
loaded to memory prior to run-time. Specifically, the p_type entry in the program header
table, shown in Table 5.1, is scanned for the loadable segments in the code (indicated
Figure 5.5: The ELF file structure showing the ELF header, program and section header
tables and the different types of code and data segments and sections.
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Table 5.1: The program header table showing the entries used to locate different segments
in the ELF file.
ELF Address p_type p_offset p_vaddr p_filesz p_memsz
... ... ... ... ... ...
0x94 PT_LOAD 0x00 0x8000 0xFC4 0xFC4
0xB4 PT_LOAD 0x1000 0x11000 0x138 0x13C
... ... ... ... ... ...
by PT_LOAD). For example, in this scenario the executable code segment found at offset
0x00 with a size of 0xFC4 in the ELF file is to be loaded into the virtual memory of the
application at address 0x8000. The p_offset, p_vaddr, p_filesz and p_memsz
entries are used to map the loadable segments from the ELF file to the virtual memory
when the application is to be run as shown in Figure 5.6. The extracted loadable pages are
utilized to generate the golden hashes which are then stored in secure memory.
At run-time, to allow for seamless integration between the hardware and the Linux OS
kernel, we use specific Linux function calls along with the process information pseudo-file
system (/proc). For example, as shown in Figure 5.7, the /proc/pid/maps pseudo-
Figure 5.6: The ELF to virtual memory mapping showing the location at which code and
data segments are loaded according to the page header table.
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Figure 5.7: Extracting the virtual addresses of the application’s pages and performing vir-
tual to physical address translation using the Linux pseudo-file system.
file is used to extract the virtual addresses of executable pages and code segments of a
running process along with the addresses of the shared libraries which the process calls.
In addition, the /proc/pid/pagemap is used to fetch the physical address of a specific
page’s virtual address and extract the page’s frame number. As mentioned in Section 5.2.2,
the PFN is sent to the hardware monitor to perform on-the-fly hash calculations and com-
parisons of the monitored processes’ pages. Therefore, our architecture supports systems
that implement ASLR since virtual-to-physical address translations are performed at run-
time.
5.3.1.2 Unmapped Page Regions
By analyzing the paging process of the Linux OS, we realized that executable code is
typically placed in a set of contiguous pages. However, the size of the code in bytes is
rarely a multiple of the page size (4096 bytes in our case). Thus, in most cases, the last
page of an executable code would have some unmapped regions. To allow for correct hash
generation during compile-time as well as run-time, we devised a technique where the
unmapped page regions are masked with a set of binary zero values before being passed
through the hash generator as shown in Figure 5.8. We start by dividing the page to a set
66
Figure 5.8: Our presented technique to handle unmapped page regions in an executable
binary. The page is divided into equally sized regions where unmapped content is zeroed
out before the page is sent to the hash algorithm.
of regions according to a predefined granularity. The granularity can be set per application
to allow for increased security at the expense of performance. For example, as shown in
Figure 5.8, the granularity is set to 4 bytes. Thus, the page is divided into 1024 regions.
If, for example, regions 1 and 3 are unmapped, the page is masked such that those regions’
binary values are ignored and substituted by zeros prior to being input to the hash generator.
This way, even if some of the unmapped bits in the page change at run-time, a correctly
regenerated hash will match the golden stored hash of that page.
5.3.1.3 Dynamically-Linked Libraries
To determine the library dependencies inside an application’s code, we used specific Linux
commands during the compilation phase of the process’s binary. For example, the com-
mand objdump is used to extract the private headers of an ELF file which are then scanned
for dynamic library dependencies [82]. The shared object (.so) files of the corresponding
libraries to be linked are then scanned to extract the libraries’ executable page contents.
The executable pages are then hashed, one page at a time, and stored in the secure database
along with the application’s native page hashes in a fashion similar to the one presented
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in Figure 5.9. To allow for scalability; furthermore, to reduce any possible performance
impact, the database is first checked to see if the shared libraries’ page hashes have been
previously created by another monitored application before regenerating new hashes. It is
important to note that in Linux the actual addresses involved in calling library functions
are masked through the indirection provided by the Procedure Linkage Table (PLT) and the
Global Offset Table (GOT) in the ELF file [82]. The dynamic loader would use the infor-
mation provided in these tables to resolve the address of the dynamically linked libraries at
run-time. Therefore, the actual code segment of the application remains consistent between
compile, load and run-time.
It is worth mentioning that to protect against attacks that try to insert malicious code
resulting in new pages that are unaccounted for, our hardware monitor can be configured
to trigger an alarm in the presence of an extra number of executable pages as compared
to the ones in the original application’s code. For example, if the monitored application
Figure 5.9: A sample file structure for storing the application’s golden hashes along with
the hashes of any dependent dynamically-linked libraries (DLLs).
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has 10 golden hashes corresponding to 10 executable pages, the hardware monitor will
be expecting to check for the integrity of only these 10 pages at run-time. Thus, if at
any instance during the execution of the process, a new executable page is allocated, the
hardware monitor will flag an alarm alerting the kernel that the new page does not have
any corresponding golden hash. Therefore, our presented architecture currently limits the
support of applications that allow for just-in-time (JIT) compilation and run-time code
relocation [71].
5.3.2 Implementing Kernel-level Integrity Assessment
When implementing the architectural extension for assessing kernel-level process integrity,
we focus on specific critical modules in the kernel. For example, in our current implementa-
tion, we monitor the kernel module responsible for the memory management of user-level
tasks and applications (task_mem). In addition, we monitor the code segment of our
kernel-level driver to ensure that the interface between the kernel and our hardware moni-
tor is intact and protected from potential malware. Therefore, at kernel compile-time, we
extract the code segments of the modules and drivers that need to be monitored. We then
create the hashes of the executable pages of these modules.
Figure 5.10 shows the timeline that the user- and kernel-level process integrity archi-
tecture follows at run-time. Directly after the secure boot process ends and the kernel fully
boots, the hardware monitor starts assessing the code integrity of the critical kernel modules
and drivers. The hardware monitor uses a hardware-only accessible register to locate the
addresses of the needed critical modules assuming that the kernel is loaded into the same
location in memory at boot-time by the bootloader. For systems that have Kernel-ASLR
(KASLR) [85] implemented, the hardware is informed of the kernel’s loaded address after
every system boot. Therefore, in these cases, our architecture is configured to use some
Linux pseudo files such as /proc/kallsyms to locate addresses of the monitored criti-
cal kernel modules directly after the kernel boots and before any applications are run on the
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Figure 5.10: A timeline showing the steps performed at run-time by the user- and kernel-
level process integrity architecture.
system. Next, the hardware monitor starts assessing the integrity of the pages of the critical
kernel modules and drivers. Concurrently, the now protected kernel-level driver waits for
the monitored user application(s) to start running. Once the operating system schedules
one of the monitored processes, the hardware monitor starts assessing the integrity of both
the recently scheduled user-level application and the kernel modules and drivers by regen-
erating the hashes of the monitored user- and kernel-level processes’ pages and comparing
them to the securely stored corresponding golden hashes. It is worth mentioning that if
the kernel monitor triggers an alarm due to a hash violation of one of the kernel’s pages,
the hardware monitor takes action typically by safely shutting down the system under the
assumption that the kernel has been attacked.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we present an overall approach, methodology and implementation of a
novel hardware-based run-time code integrity checking architecture to detect malicious
modification of application code. Specifically, we generate page-based hashes at run-time
and compare them to securely stored golden hashes using a hardware monitor that is tightly
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coupled to the processor’s main and on-chip memory. We also present and implement
a method that shows how to further expand our architecture to include assessing kernel-
level process integrity. Our presented technique provides a way to assess the integrity of
computation performed by a specific embedded device.
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CHAPTER 6
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP, RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the experimental setup and simulations along with the hardware
implementation and results of the two main architectures presented in this dissertation,
namely, the hardware Trojan detection and the run-time code integrity architectures. In
addition, performance, resource and power analysis of the architectures are reported.
The remaining sections of this chapter are divided as follows. Section 6.2 presents the
experimental setup and reports and analyzes the simulation and synthesis results of the
hardware Trojan detection architecture. Section 6.3 presents the experimental platform and
setup along with the hardware implementation of the run-time code integrity architecture.
In addition, experimental results are reported and analyzed demonstrating the effectiveness
of the presented architecture on the target platform. Finally, conclusions are drawn in the
summary in Section 6.4.
6.2 Hardware Trojan Detection
The following section reports and discusses the functional simulations and the synthesis
results of our HT detection architecture which provides a suitable method for assessing
sensor data integrity in embedded medical devices.
6.2.1 Experimental Setup
The digital components of our HT detection architecture presented in Chapter 4 and shown
in Figure 4.10 were implemented using VHDL code, simulated using Mentor Graphics
ModelSim version 10.6a and synthesized using Synopsys Design Compiler version J-
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2014.09. We tested our architecture against multiple types of HT attacks on the ECG and/or
BCG HF data that were captured over 60 seconds and sampled at a 2KHz rate from six
different individuals. The subjects were healthy and at rest during the capture process. The
human subjects measurements were approved by the Georgia Tech Institutional Review
Board, and subjects provided written informed consent. When running the experiments,
we emulated three different user health conditions that correspond to healthy individuals,
individuals with minor heart problems and individuals with severe heart conditions.
The ECG and BCG sensors that we used in our experiments have analog output values
that fall within a range of−0.9999 to 0.9999. In addition, the health monitoring application
requires an accuracy of four significant digits after the decimal. In some cases in our
architecture, values have to be squared and added, in which case the range of 0 to 1.9999
needs to be supported. Thus, to cover the range and provide the needed accuracy, we use a
signed 16-bit fixed-point format with the most significant bit as the sign bit, the next bit as
a representation of a value of 1 or 0, and the remaining 14 bits representing the fractional
part of the number.
6.2.2 Hardware Trojan Design and Detection Analysis
We designed two different variations of each of the types of HT attacks presented in our
threat model in Section 3.2.1. Specifically, we designed and implemented two HTs that
target a single point in the architecture and another two HTs that target multiple points in
the architecture. The attacks we implemented are numbered according to their type from 1
to 4. Figure 6.1 shows the locations at which these attacks target Chip 2 in our architec-
ture. Attack types 1 and 2 are single attacks targeting a single point in the architecture.































































































































6.2.2.1 Single Attack Type 1
Attack type number 1 is an example of an HT attack targeting a single point in the architec-
ture, namely, the input data as soon as it appears on Chip 2 (Figure 6.1). Our work appears
to be the first to provide an architecture able to detect such type of an attack. The difficulty
in detecting this type of attack is that it happens before even any encryption or signature
generation has been performed. Other types of signature-based HT detection techniques
fail to detect this attack as their signature generation scheme relies on the input data [30,
33]. However, in our detection approach, since the initial signature is generated in Chip 1
(Figure 4.9), only our regenerated signatures in Chip 2 (Figure 4.10) will be affected. The
comparison then with the golden signatures coming from Chip 1 will result in mismatches
and the release logic will prevent the data and signature transmission out of the chip.
6.2.2.2 Single Attack Type 2
Attack type number 2 targets the intermediate data as it passes through the different internal
modules in our architecture. Figure 6.1 shows an example of this type of attack where the
HT tries to modify the output of the multiplexer, right before the data is fed to the squarer
module for the analog-based signature (Signature 2 in Figure 6.1) regeneration. This results
in the generation of an altered Signature 2, which when compared to Signature 1 (using
Comparator Logic 2) results in a comparison mismatch and an alarm trigger. Hardware
Trojans inserted to affect the output of the different modules have been studied earlier in
the literature. Different detection techniques including signature-based ones were proven
to be effective [30, 33, 34]. However, our combined architecture provides a unique way in
detecting these attacks where multiple mechanisms operate synchronously to improve the
assurance of the integrity of the user’s medical data.
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6.2.2.3 Coordinated Attack Type 3
HT attack type 3 attempts to initiate a coordinated attack simultaneously targeting two
points in the architecture as shown in Figure 6.1. A detailed view of an HT of attack type 3
is introduced and presented in Section 4.7 and Figure 4.11. The HT trigger circuitry is
connected to two payloads. In the example of attack type 3 shown in Figure 6.1, once
the trigger is set, the HT simultaneously targets (i) the output of the encryption cipher
by modifying it and (ii) the output of the comparator logic by forcing the result of the
comparison to show a match even if the signatures at the input of the comparator logic
do not match. Since this tiny HT remains always on once triggered, the comparator logic
will always show a match regardless of input. The effect of both payloads result in the
modification of the encrypted data and its passage undetected. However, as mentioned in
Section 4.7, the comparator testing logic is inserted to detect such behavior and flag an
alarm alerting a coordinated attack on the data and the comparator.
6.2.2.4 Coordinated Attack Type 4
Figure 6.2 shows a detailed view of an HT of attack type 4. The HT trigger circuitry in
this case is also connected to two payloads. The first payload (Payload 1 in Figure 6.2)
attacks the BCG HF input data, and the second payload (Payload 2 in Figure 6.2) attacks
the analog-based signature (see Figure 6.1). A coordinated attack on the least significant
bits of the BCG HF input data and the analog-based signature (as shown in Figure 6.2) will
result in the modification of the data and, if the modified values result in | Signature 1 −
Signature 2| ≤ threshold, the HT operation might go undetected. However, the digital-
based signature (MISR) and the physiological-based signature comparisons will detect the
attack as shown in Table 4.1. In addition, it is unclear what ability the attacker would gain
by changing the low order bits as these slight variations in the values of the inputs and the
signature may also occur due to the analog nature of the application.
Another variant of attack type 4 is when the HT attempts to modify one of the high order
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Figure 6.2: An HT attacking both an internal data bus in the design and the analog-based
signature.
bits of both, the BCG HF input data and the analog-based signature. In this case, the at-
tacker would have to exploit the vector sum relation between the ECG and BCG HF inputs
to successfully modify both, the BCG HF data and the signature, in a way where the modifi-
cations pass undetected. However, this type of HT would require additional more complex
circuitry (such as multipliers and adders) and would therefore fall beyond our threat model
of a small sized HT as discussed in Section 3.2. Such types of attacks, and techniques for
detecting HTs with large footprints (e.g., via power-based techniques in addition to others),
have been well studied in the literature [24]. It is important to note that these prior HT de-
tection techniques are complementary to our work and can be incorporated alongside our
approach.
6.2.3 Simulation Results and Functional Verification
We simulated and tested multiple variations of the four types of HT attacks presented in
Section 6.2.2 and shown in Figure 6.1. In our simulations, we set the Threshold Register
of Comparator Logic 2 in Figure 4.10 to a hexadecimal value of “0008” which represents
a value of 2−11 in our fixed-point representation. The ECG peak threshold was set to
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a hexadecimal value of “2000” which is equivalent to 0.5 mV . In addition, we set the
ECG heart rate alarm ranges to represent “anomaly” when the values are below 30 bpm
(beats per minute) and above 150 bpm, “no anomaly” when the values are between 45 bpm
and 110 bpm, and “gray zone” otherwise [80]. The interval register was set to represent
400 ms. Normal R-J interval variation values were set to represent “anomaly” when the
variation is above 50%, “no anomaly” when the variation is below 15%, and “gray zone” for
variations inbetween [77]. Moreover, our HT trigger circuitry was configured to monitor
for a specific occurrence of a BCG HF data sample, e.g., a hexadecimal value of “12CF ”
which represents approximately 0.29388 mV in our fixed-point representation. Once that
same value has appeared for 64 times, the HT was launched.
6.2.3.1 Simulation of Attack Type 1
To simulate HT attack type 1 (targeting a single point at the input of the state-of-the-art
chip), we inserted HT logic similar to the one shown in Figure 3.1 targeting the input
data as it arrives on chip. For example, in some of our simulations, we inserted HT logic
that attacks the ECG input data as soon as it appears on the chip shown in Figure 6.1
by modifying the data such that one of the most significant bits in the 16-bit input was
complemented. As mentioned in Section 3.2, the HT threat scenario that we consider in
our work is triggered by some internal conditions or states. For our simulation purposes,
the HT trigger waits on an attacker-defined number of occurrences of a specific input data.
When the required condition is met, the trigger is set and the payload modifies the input
data resulting in the modification of the functional behavior of the chip.
The modification of the input data resulted in modifying the encrypted and decrypted
data which in turn lead to the modification of the MISR-based signature along with the
regenerated analog-based signature (Signature 2) right before signature comparison. Once
the maliciously modified signatures were compared to the original signatures coming from
Chip 1 (Figure 6.1), Comparator Logic 1 and Comparator Logic 2 both declared mis-
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matches. It is important to note that since the input data was altered by the HT, the values
of the signatures at the input of Comparator Logic 2 differ by an amount greater than the
threshold (2−11) and so Comparator Logic 2, similar to Comparator Logic 1, declared a
mismatch at its output. In addition, the physiological feature extraction circuitry generated
abnormal ECG heart rates and R-J interval variations confirming the mismatches of the
signatures. Therefore, the release logic, monitoring the comparators’ outputs, prevented
the transmission of the altered encrypted data and asserted the alarm signal indicating the
presence of the HT. All of this was verified through VHDL simulation using ModelSim.
6.2.3.2 Simulation of Attack Type 2
The simulation of attack type 2 was implemented in a similar fashion as attack type 1 due
to the similarity in the attack. The major difference between this attack and that of type 1
is the place where the HT attacks. In attack type 2, the HT, once triggered, modifies the
value at an output of a hardware block in the design. In our simulations, we performed
multiple separate tests by inserting HT logic at the output of the different modules of the
architecture.
For example, in one of our simulations, we inserted HT logic at the output of the mul-
tiplexer in the design as shown in Figure 6.1. This resulted in modifying a reasonably
significant bit of the BCG HF data right before signature regeneration, leading eventually
to an incorrect Signature 2. Once the regenerated signature (Signature 2) was compared to
the digital version of the analog-based signature (Signature 1), Comparator Logic 2 found
that the signature difference exceeded the threshold and thus declared a mismatch so that
the release logic prevented the transmission of the data and asserted the alarm signal.
Also, another simulation of the same attack type, this time at the output of the encryp-
tion cipher, confirmed the hypothesis presented in Section 4.3.2 for the need to decrypt the
data and recreate the signature from the regenerated plaintext rather than directly from the
input.
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6.2.3.3 Simulation of Attack Type 3
When simulating attack type 3, the HT logic had to wait for the same trigger as in the
previous attacks. When the trigger was set, the HT attacked two different points in the
architecture as shown in Figure 4.11. Figure 6.1 shows the points at which we set the HT to
attack in our simulations. Payload 1 attacked the output of the encryption cipher and even-
tually led to modifications in the regenerated signatures. Simultaneously, Payload 2 forced
the output of Comparator Logic 1 to show a match even when the compared signatures did
not match.
It is important to note here that the comparator testing logic (described in Section 4.7)
is periodically checking for this specific case. In our simulations, the periodicity was set
to 16 iterations, i.e., Test Mode in Figure 4.12 is set to 1 after 16 sets of data have been
processed through the architecture. Test Mode is asserted for only one clock cycle where
the system is stalled and the comparator output is checked for legitimate operation.
Thus, the release logic might transmit altered encrypted data depending on when the
HT is triggered. However, performing the testing periodically, can solve the problem if the
sets of data between two consecutive tests (in our case, 16 sets) can be declared invalid
if attack type 3 was detected (a multi-bit alarm signal can encode different types of alarm
conditions, e.g., a specific bit encoding of the alarm could be used to indicate failure of the
comparator testing logic).
In our simulation, we triggered the HT after six iterations of data have been processed.
After an additional ten iterations and as soon as the Test Mode was asserted, the comparator
testing logic read the result of the comparison and alerted the release logic to halt the
transmission of the data while signaling the alarm.
6.2.3.4 Simulation of Attack Type 4
To simulate attack type 4, the HT was designed to wait for the same triggering mechanism
and then attack the low order bits of both the BCG HF input data and the analog-based
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signature shown in Figure 6.2. Our simulations show that such type of attack results in
modifications to the values of Signature 1 and Signature 2; however, these modifications
are minimal (below the threshold of Comparator Logic 2) and are not detected by the
analog-based signature testing mechanism. Fortunately, the MISR signature generation
and testing method detects these types of attacks as any single bit flip in the original input
to the signature generator generally results in multiple bit flips in the generated signature
and therefore is detected by Comparator Logic 1. In addition and as expected, the physio-
logical features (ECG heart rate and R-J interval variation) indicated minor alarm severity
(gray zone) since the modifications in the features were minimal and not conclusive by
themselves. However, when coupled with the mismatch indicated by the MISR comparator
logic, the release logic was able to confirm the possibility of an HT attack and assert the
chip’s overall alarm signal.
6.2.3.5 Timing and Efficiency of Attack Detection
To compare the behavior of the different signature generation and testing techniques de-
scribed in Sections 4.3 through 4.5, we reran the same types of HT attacks while varying
the bit location which the HT inverts from the most significant bit (MSB) to the least sig-
nificant bit (LSB). The aggregated results of the average time taken to detect an HT for
each of the three techniques are presented in Figure 6.3. It is important to note that for
the physiological features-based technique, an HT is considered to be detected if the alarm
signal status indicates an anomaly or a gray zone condition. This does not apply to the
remaining two techniques (MISR-based and analog-based) as these two techniques have
only two alarm severity levels, a signature match and a signature mismatch status.
The experimental simulation results showed that the analog-based signature technique
was the fastest in detecting HTs, i.e., within a few clock cycles, but the least accurate. The
digital-based signature (MISR) technique was the most accurate and was able to detect all
types of HTs. However, MISR-based signatures took a longer time to declare an alarm after
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Figure 6.3: Time taken by each of the signature testing techniques to detect HTs targeting
different data bit locations.
an HT was triggered. That is because they require compressing multiple sets of data and
then checking for the integrity of the whole set. The accuracy of the physiological-based
signature technique relied on the type of the HT attack. For example, for HTs that attack
low order bits, a small portion were not reported (less than 5%) by the method. In addition,
attacks on low order bits of the input data took a longer time to detect, while attacks on
the most significant bits were detected at a much faster rate. Thus, the physiological-based
signature technique proved to provide moderate HT detection accuracy, but was the slowest
in HT detection primarily due to the fact that the technique inherently requires multiple sets
of data to construct physiological features.
To better understand the effect of the different HT attacks on the physiological-based
signature detection mechanism, we studied the alarm severity set by our architecture. We
also studied the time taken for the first alarm to be set indicating the presence of an HT and
the percentage of time the alarm signal indicated a definitive anomaly versus a gray zone
indicating possibility of an attack. We triggered the HT after 10 seconds of real time. The
results are reported in Table 6.1.
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Heart rate R-J interval
alarm signal alarm signal
any of the three MSBs
92ms
Anomaly: 99.68% Anomaly: 70%
of the ECG data Gray: 0.32% Gray: 30%
any of the 4th MSB to 6th
277ms
Anomaly: 76.63% Anomaly: 41.95%
LSB of the ECG data Gray: 23.37% Gray: 58.05%
any of the five LSBs
1098ms
Anomaly: 0% Anomaly: 4.67%
of the ECG data Gray: 67% Gray: 95.33%
any of the four MSBs
515ms not applicable
Anomaly: 67.39%
of the BCG HF data Gray: 32.61%
any of the 5th MSB to 6th
577ms not applicable
Anomaly: 42.72%
LSB of the BCG HF data Gray: 57.28%
any of the five LSBs
612ms not applicable
Anomaly: 5.03%
of the BCG HF data Gray: 94.97%
The results show that when an HT attacks any of the three most significant bits of
the ECG input data, the HT is detected, on average, within 92 ms. This shows that the
HT detection happens long before a new set of feature data is extracted as features are
extracted at approximately every heartbeat which is equivalent to 0.5s− 2s. The heart rate
alarm signal is asserted for the remainder of the simulation indicating an anomaly 99.68%
of the time and indicating a gray zone 0.32% of the time while the R-J interval alarm signal
indicated an anomaly 70% of the time and a gray zone 30% of the time.
When an HT attacks any of the fourth MSB to the sixth LSB of the ECG data, the alarm
is triggered, on average, after 277 ms. This delay is due to the time needed to wait until
the next feature data is extracted (R-J interval data). Thus, as soon as the new feature’s
value is calculated, the alarm signal is triggered. The heart rate alarm signal indicated an
anomaly 76.63% and a gray zone 23.37% of the remaining time of the simulation while the
R-J interval alarm signal showed an anomaly for 41.95% and a gray zone for 58.05% of the
time.
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When an HT attacks any of the five LSBs of the ECG data, the alarm signal was as-
serted after approximately 1 second which is on average equivalent to the time taken for
a heartbeat to occur. Thus, an HT attack was detected only after a new feature value was
calculated. This is expected, as HT attacks on low order bits will not significantly affect
the data to induce a peak in the ECG signal and create an early alarm. The heart rate alarm
signal predictably did not show any anomaly for the remainder of the simulation time but
indicated a gray zone status for about 67% of the time. The R-J interval alarm signal,
however, indicated an anomaly for 4.67% of the time and a gray zone for 95.33% of the
remaining simulation time.
HT attacks on the BCG HF data led to similar results with respect to the R-J interval
alarm signal. As shown in Table 6.1, the R-J interval alarm signal was triggered for all
cases around approximately 570 ms and, as mentioned earlier, this refers to the average
time taken to generate new values of the physiological features. Thus, as soon as a new
value is generated, an alarm is triggered indicating the possibility of an HT attack with
varying confidence for each of the cases as shown in Table 6.1. The ECG alarm signal, as
expected, is never triggered when the BCG HF signal is attacked since the ECG heart rate
feature does not use the BCG HF signal.
As expected, the simulation results showed that combining all three signature-based
techniques into one architecture provided the ability to successfully detect all the different
types of HT attacks defined in the threat model in the fastest time possible (within few clock
cycles). In addition, the combination of the physiological-based signatures with both the
analog and digital-based signatures not only allowed for the rapid detection of HT attacks
and hardware errors in medical devices, but also helped in distinguishing them from health
problems as reported earlier in Table 4.1. Thus, the presented HT detection architecture
in this research addresses some of the shortcomings of the similar prior work described in
Section 2.2.2 by checking for the data correctness while trying to detect HT attacks at run-
time. In addition, our results show that the devised technique is HT-size independent and
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can catch ultra-small HTs, since it looks for the effects generated by an HT momentarily
after the HT is activated rather than searching for the hidden HT inside a digital microchip.
6.2.4 Synthesis Results
The digital modules of our combined architecture were synthesized using the Synopsys
Design Compiler version J-2014.09 for Linux and were mapped to the NCSU 45 nm
Base Kit Library [86]. Table 6.2 shows the area results of the main modules of our design
post synthesis. It is obvious that a significant area of the architecture is covered by the
encryption/decryption and processing modules. The security modules that are inserted to
regenerate and test for the integrity of the data consume, as expected, a significantly lower
area.
To better show the area overhead imposed by introducing our HT detection technique,
we compute the overall area usage of the digital chip containing only the processing hard-
ware and encryption/decryption units and compare it to the overall area of our modified
architecture which includes the HT detection circuitry. The results show that the overhead
introduced by the physiological-based signatures mechanism is the lowest (around 4%) as-
Table 6.2: Area results of the major digital components of our HT detection architecture
Module Area (square microns) Area (kGE)
Encryption Cipher (PRESENT [65]) 5517 2.939
Decryption Cipher (PRESENT [65]) 5431 2.893
MISR-based Signatures Overhead 6172 3.288
MISR-based Signatures Overhead (shared with
digital systems test)
3575 1.904
Analog-based Signatures Overhead 1839 0.98
Physiological Feature Extraction 3485 1.856
Physiological-based Sig. Overhead 954 0.508
Release Logic 2414 1.286
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suming that the physiological features are part of the processing that is done on chip. The
analog-based signature generation and testing mechanism came in second with an over-
head of around 7% while the MISR-based signature generation and testing technique had
an overhead of around 14%. It is to be noted that our architecture allows for the use of any
of the presented techniques by themselves or any combination depending on the needed se-
curity of the application at hand and the available resource and power limitations. Clearly,
a combination of the three presented signature generation and testing methods achieves the
highest confidence in detecting and distinguishing HT attacks and hardware errors from
health problems at the expense of a higher area and energy consumption.
It is also important to note that in our experiments, Chip 2 contained only encryption
and decryption blocks. In more realistic scenarios, such a chip could contain other pro-
cessing and transmission modules which require larger area. Our conclusion is that the
percentage overheads reported earlier can be considered pessimistic as increasing the over-
all chip area would eventually decrease the overhead of our HT detection approach.
Our current design achieves a maximum clock frequency of 300MHz. An analysis of
the timing results show that the multiplier that is used in the generation of the analog-based
signature (Signature 2 in Figure 4.10) falls along the critical path of our architecture. We
currently implement the squaring operations in our design using Synopsys DesignWare’s
combinational carry save array multiplier. As reported by Synopsys [87], this type of im-
plementation has a delay of 3.25 ns. If the application requires a higher clock speed a
designer can choose to map the multiplier’s logic to other implementations. For example,
DesignWare has a Booth-recoded Wallace-tree multiplier which has a delay of 1.6 ns (for
a 16-bit multiplier). In addition, DesignWare provides other options of pipelined and se-
quential multipliers. Choosing between these types of implementations allows the designer
to make area versus delay trade-offs.
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6.3 Run-time Code Integrity
The following section reports and discusses the experimental and performance results along
with the resource utilization of our run-time code integrity architecture which provides
a suitable method for assessing the integrity of computation provided by an embedded
systems application such as a heart rate monitor.
6.3.1 Experimental Platform and Setup
To test the effectiveness of our run-time code integrity architecture, our experiments were
set up targeting the Digilent ZedBoard Zynq-7000 ARM/FPGA SoC development board
shown in Figure 6.4 [88].
The ZedBoard hosts an ARM Cortex dual-core A9 processor including a Zynq 7000-
series FPGA from Xilinx. The board provides an AXI bus to help interface the processing
system (PS) with the programmable logic (PL). It includes, a 256 MB Quad-SPI Flash
memory which is enough to store the needed bitstream designs and OS boot images. The
DRAM available on the ZedBoard is a 512 MB DDR3 memory and is used to run the
target application process to test our security architecture.
Thus, the hardware components of our run-time code integrity architecture were imple-
mented using a combination of VHDL and Verilog code, simulated using Mentor Graphics
ModelSim version 10.6a and synthesized using Xilinx Vivado Design Suite version 2017.4
targeting the Xilinx Zynq-7000 FPGA. In addition, as a sample embedded systems applica-
tion, we developed a heart rate monitor and sample malware targeting an embedded version
of Linux (PetaLinux) provided by Xilinx running on top of the dual-core ARM-based Cor-
tex A9 processor on the Zynq-7000 SoC [89]. Our heart monitoring application used the
same electrocardiogram (ECG) data captured from the six different individuals as reported
in Section 6.2.1.
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Figure 6.4: A top view of the Digilent Zedboard Zynq-7000 ARM/FPGA SoC development
board [88].
6.3.2 Heart Rate Monitoring Application
Heart monitors typically measure a person’s heart activity, such as rate and rhythm, and
may take the form of a small embedded handheld or portable device. Figure 6.5 shows a
similar example scenario to the one presented in Section 1.2 and Figure 1.2. However, in
this case, the embedded medical system is attached to a treadmill in an exercise facility.
The medical device monitors the heart rate activity of an individual while exercising. The
person’s electrocardiogram (ECG) signals are measured using grip-style dry electrode sen-
sors [17] mounted on the handlebars of the treadmill. The captured ECG data is then used
to find the person’s heart rate. The calculated heart rate is displayed to the individual in
real time. The embedded system is also internet connected to allow for syncing the user’s
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Figure 6.5: An example scenario of an embedded heart rate monitor attached to a treadmill
machine in an exercise facility.
data with the cloud to perform long-term analysis and health diagnosis.
The heart rate monitor used in our experiments can be represented by the block diagram
of Figure 6.6. An ECG sensor is used to capture the user’s data which is then amplified
and passed through a band-pass filter to improve the data’s signal-to-noise ratio (SNR).
The captured data is then fed to an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) which quantizes and
samples the data at a 2 KHz rate. The filtered and sampled ECG data is then stored in
Figure 6.6: A heart monitor block diagram composed of electrocardiogram (ECG) sensors,
amplifiers, filters, analog-to-digital converters (ADCs), a system processor, a memory, a
processor interface, a display driver and a user interface.
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the memory of the embedded device. The system processor runs an application to read the
stored data for further processing and analysis. In our experiments, the sample heart rate
monitoring application analyzes a user’s ECG data to find the heart rate of the individual
in real-time. Specifically, our software C code calculates the heart rates by scanning for
consecutive ECG samples and finding the highest value (R-peak) within an ECG signal
period. The time difference between two consecutive ECG R-peaks is registered and used
to calculate a heart rate value. Figure 6.7 shows a sample result of the display of the user’s
heart rate monitor showing a current heart rate of 81.41 bpm.
6.3.3 Run-time Memory Corruption Malware
To test our run-time code integrity architecture against our target threat model described
in Section 3.3, we developed in-house sample malware targeting the heart rate monitoring
application described in Section 6.3.2. Our malware is assumed to have escalated privi-
leges such that it is able to read and modify other user processes’ memory contents. The
assumption is that the attacker has enough resources to be able to capture the source and
binary code of the target application – heart rate monitor in our case – to devise the attack.
The developed malware sample is assumed to have avoided detection so far and attacks the
heart rate monitor code at run-time and modifies the code contents of the application by
Figure 6.7: A heart rate monitor displaying a person’s current heart rate with value of
81.41 bpm along with the person’s heart rate history over the past 30 seconds.
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substituting a single instruction. We designed two variations of this malware. Specifically,
in the first variation, a subtraction (rsb) instruction is replaced with a move (mov) instruc-
tion, and in the second variation the subtraction instruction is substituted by an addition
(add) instruction.
Figure 6.8a shows a code snippet from the original heart rate monitoring application
in the C language listing a series of instructions where the heart rate is calculated by sub-
tracting two consecutive values of the ECG R-peak. The heart rate is then displayed to the
user. The subtraction instruction is shown in boldface in Figure 6.8a. Figure 6.8b shows
the equivalent binary code of the compiled and assembled instructions targeting the ARM
assembly language. The corresponding assembly subtraction instruction (rsb) is shown




Figure 6.8: (a) Application code snippet in C. (b) Binary and assembly code snippet of heart
monitoring application. (c) Binary and assembly code snippet of attacked application.
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plication with the first variation of the malware where the rsb instruction is substituted
by the mov instruction. The effect of this change masks the result of the calculation logic
of the heart rate monitor leading to the generation of a perfectly normal heart rate value
instead of the user’s actual heart rate even if the user is having symptoms of a heart failure,
thus potentially hiding the need for immediate medical help. The other variation where the
rsb instruction is substituted by the add instruction would make the heart rate calculation
display inaccurate values, potentially causing unnecessary efforts by the individual to seek
medical help.
6.3.4 Hardware Implementation and Experimental Results
Figure 6.9 shows a diagram of our architecture implementation targeting the Zynq devel-
opment board. To perform our tests, we generate at compile-time golden hashes of the
executable pages (including any required dynamically linked libraries) of the critical ker-
nel modules and drivers along with those of the monitored application (heart rate). The
Figure 6.9: A detailed block diagram of the architectural implementation on the Digilent
Zedboard.
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golden hashes are stored in a secure memory (Block RAM in Figure 6.9) which is com-
pletely isolated from software (user and kernel space). The hardware monitor uses these
hashes to check for the integrity of the user- and kernel-level processes’ code at run-time.
To launch our run-time detection mechanism, as soon as the kernel boots, our hardware
monitor accesses the pages of the kernel module task_mem and starts to periodically as-
sess the pages’ integrity. In the meantime, a kernel-level driver is started after the processor
boots into a secure state. Once the kernel-level driver starts running, the hardware monitor
is informed of the driver pages’ addresses, and the integrity of the driver’s code is now
also continuously assessed. The kernel-level driver sets up the communication interface
with the Programmable Logic (PL) in the FPGA and waits on the monitored process to
start running. In our current implementation, we only monitor one application (the heart
rate monitor); however, monitoring of multiple applications can be seamlessly integrated
into our architecture. In fact, to ensure that this integration process can be easily done, we
instantiated multiple runs of the heart rate monitor on different ECG data sets from two
different individuals. Once an instance of the heart rate monitoring application is assigned
a process id (pid), the kernel-level driver begins to continuously monitor the memory map-
ping of that process and extracts the physical addresses of the statically and dynamically
linked executable pages. It then consecutively sends these physical addresses to the hard-
ware monitor.
The hardware monitor in turn grabs the contents of the process pages from physical
memory using the implemented AXI DMA streaming interface shown in Figure 6.9. Every
process page is then fed through a hardware implementation of the SHA 256 algorithm [90],
and the generated hash result is compared to the corresponding golden hash stored in the
hardware isolated memory (Block RAM). Comparison results are then passed back to the
kernel in the case of a failure as an interrupt. The kernel-level driver then takes control by
halting the affected process. In the case where two instances of the heart rate monitor are
simultaneously run, the kernel-level driver would consecutively send the physical addresses
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of the pages of both processes to the hardware monitor for it to continuously assess the
integrity of all the running monitored processes along with the memory management kernel
module and the kernel-level driver.
6.3.4.1 Performance Analysis
To measure the effectiveness of our implemented architecture, we ran the heart rate mon-
itoring application on a base design architecture excluding any of our presented security
mechanisms and evaluated the performance of the system. The hardware was run at a
clock frequency of 70 MHz (the maximum achievable frequency with the current FPGA
implementation of SHA256 [90]). The metric involved in our performance evaluation was
the time taken by an instance of the heart rate monitoring application to read 120, 000 sam-
ples of ECG data (i.e., 60 seconds of ECG data since each second provides 2000 ECG data
samples), process them, and continuously calculate and display the heart rate of the indi-
vidual. This was done on the data sets of all six individuals. The aggregated timing results
are shown in Table 6.3. We similarly re-ran the same heart rate monitoring application
having the two malware variations execute and change the calculation of the application
as shown in Section 6.3.3. The malware was randomly triggered using a combination of
randomly selected system time and a keyword in keyboard inputs resulting in its execution
Table 6.3: Performance evaluation results comparing the baseline architecture with two ver-
sions of the modified process integrity architecture on the Digilent Zedboard development
board.
Architecture
Time to run (ms)
Heart rate Attacked application
application Malware 1 Malware 2
Baseline 60, 362 61, 855 62, 021
Modified for user-level process 60, 671
halted early halted early
integrity / Overhead / 0.5%
Modified for user- and kernel-level 60, 928
halted early halted early
process integrity / Overhead / 0.94%
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at different time instances during the application execution. Once triggered, the malware
runs for a specific amount of time and then reconfigures the memory back to its normal
state trying to mask the damage done. Since in this test we are not running our designed
security mechanism, the malware was able to fully execute. With the malware running, we
again measured the time taken by the heart rate monitoring application to perform the same
tasks. The results are reported in Table 6.3.
Finally, we re-ran the application in the two different cases described earlier; however,
this time the architecture was built and modified to introduce our hardware-based monitor-
ing approach for assessing process integrity by modifying the PetaLinux kernel to insert our
drivers and configuring the FPGA bitstream to implement our hardware monitor as shown
in Figure 6.9. The performance of two versions of the modified architecture in terms of
the aggregated time taken to execute the heart rate monitoring application on data from six
different individuals is shown in Table 6.3. The first modified architecture included moni-
toring user-level processes only, while the second modified architecture included monitor-
ing both user- and kernel-level processes and drivers. The results show that both versions
of our architecture introduce minimal overhead on the performance of the ARM processor,
specifically since the actual monitoring is only happening in hardware, and the software
(Linux kernel driver) is minimally involved. In fact, the kernel-level driver is only carry-
ing out the process of performing virtual to physical address resolution and sending the
addresses to the hardware monitor. Therefore, continuously monitoring the page hashes of
the application does not impact the target processor’s performance.
Another critical metric that defines the effectiveness of our architecture is the time
it takes our hardware monitor to detect the change in memory contents and report that
change to the kernel. This was measured on our FPGA platform by starting a timer once
the malware was triggered and calculating the time taken by the hardware to trigger an
interrupt into the kernel. Figure 6.10 shows a sample of the output showing the monitoring
of the heart rate application, the launch of the malware and the time taken by the user-
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Figure 6.10: A snapshot of the output terminal showing the detection of the malware under
the user-level process integrity architecture.
level process integrity architecture to detect the malware and kill the heart rate application.
Similarly, Figure 6.11 shows an instance of the time taken to detect the malware attacking
the heart rate application when the user- and kernel-level process integrity architecture is
implemented. Notice that in Figure 6.11, the kernel monitor started as soon as the secure
boot process finished to ensure the integrity of the monitored kernel-level modules directly
after boot time. The security monitor then waited for the heart rate application to start.
Once the application started, the monitor also started vetting the heart rate application’s
pages along with pages of the kernel-level module task_mem.
The aggregated results of the malware detection time for the two versions of our se-
curity architecture running on data from the six different individuals are reported in Ta-
ble 6.4. This shows that our architecture is capable of detecting a malicious modifica-
tion (as small as an instruction-level modification) to the heart rate application on average
within 250− 350 µs if the architecture is monitoring user-level processes only, and within
700−800 µs if the architecture is monitoring both user- and kernel-level processes. In other
96
Figure 6.11: A snapshot of the output terminal showing the detection of the malware under
the user- and kernel-level process integrity architecture.
words, for a malware to be successful and circumvent our architecture (bypass the time-of-
check to time-of-use TOCTOU race condition), the malware has to change the executable
content of the application, perform its desired task and reconfigure the memory back to its
normal state, all within this short time frame of less than a millisecond. Otherwise, our
architecture will detect and flag the discrepancy resulting in a safe halt of the running ap-
plication since the hardware monitor is continuously scanning all allocated physical pages
Table 6.4: Performance evaluation results showing the time taken to detect the malware
after its triggered.
Architecture
Malware Time to detect malware (µs)
variation Best Worst Average
User-level process integrity
1 220 543 287
2 235 601 328
User- and kernel-level process integrity
1 635 985 720
2 647 996 801
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of the monitored application(s).
The periodicity of comparing the same page hash depends on the number of pages
present in the application. In our experiments, the hash comparison for all the pages took
around 600 µs for the user-level process integrity architecture and 1 ms for the user- and
kernel-level process integrity architecture. These results were validated by the times taken
to detect the malware attacks in the worst cases.
It is important to mention that the current detection times reported in Table 6.4 can
be dramatically improved if the presented architecture is implemented on an ASIC chip
with dedicated hardware resources as opposed to reconfigurable blocks on an FPGA. In
addition, hardware parallelism can be introduced to allow for concurrent hash computation
and simultaneous checking of multiple pages. Moreover, for ease of implementation, we
currently implement parts of the DMA controller in software. Ideally, the controller will
be fully implemented in hardware achieving faster malware detection. However, in our
application scenario, heart rates are typically generated within 0.5 − 2.5 sec and thus no
further optimizations to the detection times are needed.
As opposed to the techniques presented in the literature, our architecture works on code
that is present in memory and ready to be executed instead of relying on static instruction-
based analysis and dynamic checking of expected code behavior. Thus, when comparing
our performance results with similar work where code integrity is checked via hardware
monitors [51–53], our approach presents a faster detection response with the ability to
detect zero-day malware without imposing significant performance degradation on the em-
bedded target processor. As shown in [51], using hashes of basic blocks for checking in-
struction integrity imposes a substantial overhead. For example, checking for the integrity
of all the basic blocks of an application using the technique presented in [51] results in
doubling the average clock cycles per instruction (CPI) of a processor. In contrast, our pre-
sented method eliminates this overhead by generating hashes for pages, thus significantly
speeding up the integrity checking process. In addition, when comparing our architecture
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to other software-related approaches, our work imposes fewer coding style limitations due
to the reduced compile-time preprocessing that is required. Finally, our method provides
a higher level of security as our hash generation and checking mechanism is completely
isolated from software, and our technique only relies on basic kernel processes that are
checked for their integrity using the same presented method.
6.3.4.2 Resource and Power Analysis
To study the impact of our code integrity architecture on resource and power utilization, we
implemented both the baseline and the modified design targeting the same Digilent Zed-
board Zynq-7000 ARM/FPGA SoC development board. Implementation results reported
by the Vivado Design Suite showing area overhead imposed by our hardware architecture
are presented in Table 6.5. In addition, estimates of the power utilization as reported by
Vivado are shown in Table 6.6.
The reported results in Table 6.5 and 6.6 are for the architecture implementing both
user- and kernel-level process monitoring. It is important to note that extending the archi-
tecture to support kernel-level process monitoring on top of user-level process monitoring
did not significantly impact the area results. In fact, the difference between the two ar-
chitecture versions can primarily be observed in the difference in Block RAM usage. As
expected, the architecture implementing both user- and kernel-level process integrity re-
quires more secure memory resources to store the golden hashes. Moreover, as the power
utilization results in Table 6.6 show, the added security components do not incur signifi-
Table 6.5: Implementation results reported by the Vivado Design Suite showing the hard-
ware overhead imposed by our architecture.
Zynq-7000 FPGA Resource Utilization
LUT LUT RAM Flip Flop Block RAM IO BUFG
Utilization 5091 1096 4391 8 8 1
Overall % 9.57 6.3 4.13 5.71 4 3.13
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Table 6.6: Power estimates of the implemented design targeting the Zynq-7000 FPGA
board as reported by the Vivado Design Suite.
Power (mW )
Clocks Signals Logic Block RAM IO PS7 Dynamic Device Static Total
12 15 13 1 6 1532 1579 146 1725
cant overhead since most of the energy is consumed by the Zynq processing system (PS7
in Table 6.6).
6.4 Summary
The experimental results and analysis presented in this chapter show that our designed
and implemented HT detection and run-time code integrity architectures successfully de-
tect different types of hardware and software malicious modifications attacking embedded
medical devices.
Our hardware simulation and implementation results showed that the developed HT de-
tection architecture was able to successfully detect the targeted types of HTs defined in the
threat model including ones that target single points and multiple points in the architecture.
Our run-time code integrity architecture was able to successfully and quickly detect
zero-day malware attacks on applications running on an embedded device such as a heart
rate monitoring application. By focusing on physical memory integrity at the page-level
for each process, the presented architecture reduces as much as possible any performance
overhead by performing integrity checks in parallel using a dedicated hardware memory
monitor.
Our synthesis results and hardware implementation show that it is feasible to implement
both of our architectures while introducing minimal resource and performance overhead.
100
CHAPTER 7
EMBEDDED SYSTEMS SECURITY IMPACT AND OPEN RESEARCH
QUESTIONS
7.1 Introduction
A majority of the hardware security techniques presented in this dissertation can be further
improved and utilized to detect similar attacks on embedded systems in general. Therefore,
the impact of this dissertation can touch a wide range of systems especially with the rapid
growth of the Internet-of-Things (IoT) where resource constrained devices become highly
interconnected making them a lucrative target for attackers. A major portion of these de-
vices belong to the family of sensor nodes (Figure 7.1). Similar to medical and health
systems, attacks on these critical sensor nodes and falsifying the captured data could also
result in disastrous effects.
In this chapter, we present a modified version of the architecture described in Chapter 4
to help detect hardware-level attacks on a generic sensor node resulting in malicious mod-
ifications to the captured data and the on-chip computation [91]. As mentioned earlier in
Section 4.2, our approach is similar in principal to the prover verifier technique presented
in [72] where a trusted domain is used to verify the correct operation of an untrusted do-
main that acts as a prover of correct operation. However, our technique presents a dual-chip
Figure 7.1: The main components of a generic wireless sensor node used to manage the
capture and transmission of data.
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approach to assess the integrity of the data as opposed to verifying the full specifications
of the hardware components resulting in a simpler yet secure architecture that is able to
guarantee with a high probability that the actual output of our design is as expected, in this
case, proving that the data captured by the sensor node has not been maliciously modified
on-chip. In addition, we present some open research questions and avenues for future work
that could help improve the techniques presented in this dissertation to allow for better
hardware and software security.
7.2 Chip-level Security Framework for Assessing Sensor Data Integrity
The scheme presented in this chapter builds on the technique discussed in Chapter 4 and on
some of our published work in creating secure hardware by splitting the design into trusted
and untrusted hardware domains [19–22]. However, in our previous attempts we relied on
some assumptions where parts of the untrusted domain are considered to be trusted. In this
section, we present a modified hardware framework for secure design with state-of-the-art
untrusted chip fabrication. Figure 7.2 shows how a sensor node hardware could be split
into a Trusted Verifier Chip and an Untrusted Prover Chip. Similar to our original archi-
tecture presented in Chapter 4, the trusted chip contains the sensor node components that
are responsible for capturing analog data and digitizing the captured data. This microchip
is manufactured in a secure and provisioned in-house fab. The untrusted chip contains the
sensor node components that require cutting edge technology and is fabricated in a state-
of-the-art facility. In addition, our modified framework allows for a way to provide secure
reconfiguration of parts of the untrusted state-of-the-art chip so as to improve the overall
security of the sensor node design.
7.2.1 Detailed Security Architecture
The design in the Trusted Verifier Chip is modified to add security components that help

































































































































































Specifically, the Trusted Verifier Chip creates golden hashes of the data as it is being cap-
tured by the sensors. In addition, verification logic is used to test for the sanity of the
components in the Untrusted Prover Chip. The added security components are highlighted
by the shaded boxes in Figure 7.2.
The design in the Untrusted Prover Chip is modified to add the checking logic required
to verify the integrity of the data and the respective computation while the data is being
processed on chip. Specifically, a hash generator is used to regenerate the hashes of the
captured sensor data before the data is transmitted out of the chip. The generated hashes
are compared to the golden hashes at run-time and an Internal Alarm signal is sent from
the Prover Chip to the Verifier Chip indicating the result of the comparison. The security
components in the Prover Chip are checked for sanity of operation by the Verifier Chip at
run-time.
During normal operation, the control unit in the Verifier Chip deasserts the select and en
signals. The resulting datapath allows for the normal creation and passage of the captured
data along with the golden hashes from the Verifier to the Prover. In addition, in this mode,
the Alarm signal in the Trusted Verifier Chip will have the same value of Internal Alarm
coming from the Untrusted Prover Chip.
Periodically, the control unit in the Verifier Chip sets the en signal to a logic value of
‘1’ for one clock cycle to store a single hash of some sensor data then returns the system
to normal operation. After another set amount of time and during the interval taken by the
sensors and analog-to-digital converters to capture and digitize new data, the control unit
sets the select signal to a logic value of ‘1’. At that instance, the datapath is reconfigured
to pass the stored hash (a hash of some old data) along with new data to the prover chip.
Ideally, the Prover Chip should return an asserted Internal Alarm indicating a mismatch
between the regenerated hash and the golden hash passed from the Verifier Chip. This test
phase verifies that the Hash Comparator block in the Prover Chip is behaving as expected.
Specifically, since the Verifier sent some sensor data along with a hash that is known not to
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match the data, the Verifier expects the Prover to send back an asserted Internal Alarm sig-
nal indicating an attack. However, if the Internal Alarm signal is not raised, the architecture
will then flag the main Alarm signal.
7.2.2 Secure Hardware Reconfiguration
Our architecture can also be modified to include the ability to securely reprogram reconfig-
urable logic in the state-of-the-art Untrusted Prover Chip. As shown in the dotted boxes in
Figure 7.2, a secure Bitstream Memory can be added to the design in the Trusted Verifier
Chip so that various reconfiguration bitstreams can be securely stored and transmitted to
the Untrusted Prover Chip for run-time reconfiguration of the hardware implemented in the
chip. For example, the security modules (shown in the shaded box) in the Untrusted Prover
Chip can be reconfigured at run-time to allow for more flexibility depending on the needed
security and present hardware resources of the sensor node.
7.2.3 Attacks and Analysis
Similar to the discussed attacks in Chapter 4, the presented architecture in this chapter tar-
gets HTs that could be inserted to attack the primary inputs or any of the internal compo-
nents of the untrusted chip. Attacks on the primary inputs, the microcontroller, the memory
and/or the hash generator will be detected as any attempt to modify the data or the regen-
erated hash results in a failure when the comparison between the regenerated hash and
the golden hash coming from the Untrusted Prover Chip happens. Attacks on the Hash
Comparator block are detected by the mechanism provided in the Trusted Verifier Chip.
Namely, if the attack attempts to fool our system by asserting a match even when the com-
parison is failing, the Internal Alarm sent back from the Prover Chip to the Verifier Chip
will be tested for that specific failure case as described in Section 7.2.1. Finally, attacks on
the transmitter resulting in modifications to the data or the hash can be detected by sim-
ply checking for the consistency of the sent data with the appended hash when the data is
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received at the destination or during its transmission in the cloud.
Therefore, with minor modifications to the architecture presented in Chapter 4, we are
able to provide a framework that helps in assessing data integrity in generic sensor nodes.
Although we can guarantee with a high probability that incoming sensor data has not been
altered while being received and processed by a state-of-the-art digital chip, we might not
be able to fully guarantee that the outgoing sensor data has not been altered at all. However,
our framework provides the means for the receiving end, e.g., the cloud, to perform specific
checks to catch any such alterations.
7.3 Physical Layer Hardware Signatures as a Basis for Improved System Security
Our novel chip-level security framework presented in this dissertation could play a vital
role as a basis for an improved security scheme that could be implemented for embedded
devices with critical operations. The hardware technique along with its associated alarm
signals can be used as run-time alerts for higher level policies and protocols. For example,
our heart rate alarm signal presented in Chapter 4 and discussed in detail in Sections 4.5.1
and 4.5.3 could be divided into different severity levels and fed through to higher level
software as one security metric that can be used to evaluate the trustworthiness of the
underlying hardware components of a system.
In general, a hardware-level security architecture could then be devised out of multiple
differently weighted security metrics and be fed to a higher level trust evaluator, such as
the one presented in [92], to assess and determine the level of trust of a node in a network.
In our heart rate example, the boundaries for the severity level of the alarm can be set as
described in Section 4.5.4 and as shown in Figure 7.3. The set boundaries can be fine-tuned
per individual to provide better accuracy.
The following subsection presents an example scenario showing how our hardware
techniques can be used as a basis for evaluating the trustworthiness of the hardware com-
ponents in a generic multi-layered trust environment to provide secure vehicle-to-vehicle
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communication in autonomous cars.
7.3.1 Secure Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) Communication
To provide better security for critical embedded systems, a multi-layer trust model can
be implemented similar to the one shown in Figure 7.4. As the figure depicts, security
techniques can be implemented at multiple layers such as (i) at the network, transport
and application layers; (ii) at the physical and data link layers; and (iii) at the sensor and
hardware layers. The techniques implemented at each of the layers will interact with each
other at run-time to provide a better assessment of the security of an embedded system,
in this case, an autonomous vehicle. For example, at the network layer, a network-based
decentralized trust model [93] can be implemented where multiple nodes in a network
can rate each others’ trust. The network layer trust model would not only rely on the
trust feedback provided from peers in the network, but also on metrics provided from the
underlying layers.
The techniques presented in this dissertation can be implemented in the scheme pre-
sented in Figure 7.4. In fact, the alarm signals generated by our architecture can be fed to
the upper physical and software layers to warn the system of possible malicious nodes in
the network. In addition, our technique could benefit from feedback sent down from upper
layers to improve the accuracy of detecting hardware attacks and errors.
Figure 7.3: Different security alarm levels depending on the value of a patient’s heart rate.
A high level of trust is sent when the heart rate value ranges between 45 and 110 bpm
(green zone). The trust level degrades as the heart rate value diverges (yellow to orange
zone) from this normal range. A heart rate value below 30 bpm and above 150 bpm would
























































7.4 Open Research Questions
The research presented in this dissertation can be further improved to allow for better hard-
ware and software security. In this section we present some open research questions and
hint at potential solutions as avenues for future research.
7.4.1 Hardware Security
New techniques for attack localization and mitigation can be researched to analyze what
can be done after a potential HT intrusion is discovered. In particular, a random error, e.g.,
due to thermal noise or x-rays flipping a logic bit value, could trigger a false alarm. A
more complete approach would include a higher level protocol for identification of non-
malicious random errors as a distinct class from errors which appear highly likely to be
caused by an HT.
Another comment can be made about the transmission of the hardware signatures. Fig-
ure 4.10 shows that our architecture only encrypts the data and transmits the signatures out
of the chip without explicitly encrypting them. Clearly, sending the signatures unencrypted
might open an avenue of attack in later stages since an attacker may be able to exploit the
unencrypted signatures to reveal information about the encrypted data. To prevent these
types of threats, encrypting the signature can be done prior to transmission. Specifically, in
a more complete view of a System-on-Chip (SoC) including logic for transmission packet
formation, Figure 4.10 can be modified to include a similar logic to the one shown in
Figure 7.5 to ensure only a properly encrypted bitstream is transmitted. Figure 7.5 shows
multiple 16-bit analog-based signatures input to a FIFO buffer to form a block of 64-bit data
Figure 7.5: An example of encrypting analog-based signatures prior to transmission.
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that then can be fed to an encryption cipher, such as PRESENT [65], to form an encrypted
bitstream that is ready for transmission.
7.4.2 Software Security
The presented run-time code integrity architecture can be further improved to address some
of the challenges introduced when supporting applications that allow for just-in-time (JIT)
compilation and run-time code relocation [71]. One possibility is to include page hash
generation both in software as well as in the hardware root-of-trust as an enrollment process
for pages with code modifications. The challenge will be to keep this page hash generation
process out of the hands of the adversary. Another challenge to be addressed is with cases
of dynamic linking that involve object code modification at run-time by allowing for the
insertion of new golden hashes at run-time.
Moreover, the security of our presented architecture can be improved by continuously
searching for and addressing newer attack vectors that try to find and exploit any weakness
that our architecture might have. For example, an adversary can try to craft an attack
that takes advantage of the unmapped regions in executable pages to insert malicious code
modules. One way to address such type of exploitation is by imposing a limitation on the
mapping of executable pages where instead of masking the unmapped regions, the kernel
would zero out these regions. This would improve the security of our architecture at the
expense of a slight performance degradation due to a possible increase in paging overhead.
In addition, one interesting avenue to be further explored is looking into ways that not
only focus on quick detection but also provide some corrective measures when possible.
For example, a fast enough detection could help in preventing corrupted data from being
used where the processor can be minimally stalled until the hash comparison is done.
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7.5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented example scenarios for utilizing a generic chip-level security
framework to detect malicious hardware modifications to state-of-the-art microchips that
are widely used in embedded devices such as sensor nodes for capturing and transmitting
data in the exploding world of IoT. Our architecture acts as a dual-chip approach composed
of a prover and a verifier where the verifier continuously challenges the prover to maintain
correct operation and detect any malicious modifications to the hardware. Preliminary
analysis shows promise that our technique could be seamlessly integrated into a wider
range of applications to help improve system security such as improving the level of trust
in hardware in an example of a multi-layered trust model. The techniques presented in this
dissertation can be further improved to help create an architecture that is more robust to




This dissertation presents two different approaches for detecting run-time software and
hardware malicious modifications in medical devices through the use of hardware signa-
tures.
In the first approach, a hardware-based signature generation and testing architecture
for detecting extremely small hardware Trojans in embedded medical devices is designed,
simulated and synthesized. Three different techniques for signature generation are devel-
oped, namely, analog-, digital- and physiological-based signatures. In addition, an over-
all architecture combining all the three signature techniques is implemented. Simulation
and synthesis results show that the developed architecture successfully detects the targeted
types of HTs defined in the threat model with minimal area and performance overhead.
The second approach presents a novel hardware-assisted run-time code integrity check-
ing architecture to detect malicious modification to application code running on an em-
bedded processor in medical devices. The architecture relies on generating page-based
signatures at compile time and storing these signatures in a root-of-trust. During execution
time, a secure hardware monitor is used to continuously monitor the physical memory of
the processor, grab a copy of the running application’s pages and regenerate hardware sig-
natures at run-time and compare them to the stored golden signatures. Our novel technique
is implemented and evaluated on a Digilent Zedboard which holds an embedded ARM pro-
cessor and a Xilinx Zynq-7000 FPGA. Results show that code integrity is achieved with
minimal resource, power and performance overhead.
In summary, the software and hardware security architectures presented in this disserta-
tion provide a basis for a methodology for protecting medical systems (e.g., heart monitors)
from potentially malicious run-time code modifications and hardware attacks and errors.
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Our architectures present novel ways of implementing dynamic code run-time integrity
checking and hardware Trojan detection mechanisms using hardware-assisted signature
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